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Limits of the Rule of Law:
Negotiating Afghan “Traditional”
Law in the International Civil
Trials in the Czech Republic
Tomáš Ledvinka* and James M. Donovan**
ABSTRACT
Drawing on ethnographic research of judicial cases in the
Czech Republic which involve the law in migrants' countries of
origin, this Article outlines how multiple strategies handle
encounters with the legal-cultural differences of Afghanistan in
order to neutralize what may be called the “alterity” of law. The
Article suggests that far from being analytical tools, concepts
such as “context,” “culture,” and “customary” are strategically
used by courts to neutralize unsettling aspects of foreign Afghan
legalities. Further, it applies Leopold Pospíšil´s ethnological
concept of legal authority as a vehicle for reinterpreting the
contextual differentiation of Afghan “traditional” law as an
alternative to the standard judicial approach. Lastly, this Article
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suggests that the legal-cultural differences in this and similar
cases can be bridged by a new concept of legal sodality, which
offers an anthropologization of legal authorities’ distinctive
manner of imagining the law of the others.
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INTRODUCTION: FOREIGN-LAW ADJUDICATION BETWEEN
LAW AND ETHNOLOGY

Images of a territorially bounded law within and beneath nationstates often hide deeply seated legal and normative orders. The
shifting global interdependence and technological advances in digital
communication in particular have brought details of subnational
orders of law closer to foreign-law adjudication. These subnational
legalities form part of migrants’ transnational bonds and foreign “local”
legal systems, but they are not merely foreign statutes that have
entered the intimate domestic legal framework. These encounters pose
vexing practical questions for domestic legal arenas, which often
require the help of legal-anthropological expertise. The example this
Article explores, Afghan traditional legalities localized first in
international civil trials in the Czech Republic as well as in research
reports concerning the law in Afghanistan, reveals a new way that the
law may be conceptually understood that is in line with Leopold
Pospíšil´s theory of legal multiplicity.
The findings challenge an assumption embedded in the
transnational idea of legal transplants that law should be seen as an
objective, bounded, and territorially fixed system of values and
principles. Instead of the laws travelling, this Article asserts that a
significant number of Afghan traditional tribunals involve Afghan
legal authorities travelling and crossing societal boundaries. This
trans-societal and inter-community composition of traditional councils
disintegrates the image of the traditional law as a limited local system.
These two kinds of legal mobility are labelled “transnational” and
“translocal” respectively, with the reservation that the term “local” still
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carries a subnational meaning but not necessarily one that is
subordinate to the central nation-state.
Based on observations of foreign adjudication in international civil
trials in the Czech Republic, this study further claims that the Afghan
trans-societal composition of legal authorities is in fact incompatible
with the transnational mobility of legal systems. Specifically, Afghan
traditional infrastructure of intersocietal dispute resolution represents
an untransferable aspect of migrants’ legal identity assumed during
foreign-law adjudication. This observation poses a more general
hypothesis about the locus of law whose validity may be informed by
data from different ethnographic sites.
This exploration starts at a peculiar place in foreign-law
adjudication in the Czech Republic: Czech judges in the Czech Republic
sometimes face the duty to apply foreign law in the context of
international civil trials involving migrants that are governed by
private international law.1 Foreign law may be applied in various ways
depending on the circumstances of the case and applicable conflict-oflaw rules of private international law. In the Czech Republic, this
instruction is laid out in Article 23 (“The Ascertainment and Use of
Foreign Law”) of the Act on Private International Law, which states
that “a foreign body of laws which should be applied . . . must be
applied in the way that it is used in the territory to which it applies.”2
Czech judges navigate through the law of other countries with
only its textual representations and their theoretical legal knowledge
to guide them. When foreign law is applied as binding in private
matters, the occasion requires “one-shot applications of foreign law to
specific litigants” who are usually both foreigners.3 Before this can
happen, however, the judge has a legal imperative to conduct thorough
research behind the scenes.
In cases of very unfamiliar legal cultures, such as that of
Afghanistan, judges face an enormous task to identify the actual law
and then to correctly familiarize themselves with it. Besides the
legislation of the government in Kabul and the system of state courts,
judges may also encounter information about unusual forms of law
embedded in traditional legal authorities. Together with the data

1.
The foreign law of another country is most typically adjudicated by Czech
courts in civil, commercial, family and inheritance matters, which involve foreign
litigant(s) or a piece of real estate abroad.
2.
Zákon o mezinárodním právu soukromém [Act on Private International Law],
Zákon č. 91/2012 Sb. (Czech), translated in MINISTRY OF JUSTICE OF THE CZECH
REPUBLIC
http://obcanskyzakonik.justice.cz/images/pdf/Act-Governing-PrivateInternational-Law.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2021) [https://perma.cc/N4F4-2WPN]
(archived Sept. 15, 2021).
3.
Christopher A. Whytock, Foreign Law in Domestic Courts: Different Uses,
Different Implications, in GLOBALIZING JUSTICE: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND THE CROSS-BORDER MIGRATION OF LEGAL NORMS 45, 53
(Donald W. Jackson, Michael C. Tolley, & Mary L. Volcansek, eds., 2010).
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about the dysfunctional nature of the state courts and legislation,4
these facts may spark a reorientation concerning where the actual law
in Afghanistan is found.
Traditional Afghan dispute resolution bodies (“jirgas” or “councils”
in related Western literature5) have a number of features that are
unfamiliar to judges in the Czech Republic. These include the
gathering of men sitting on the ground, ceremonial dress, discussions
in the open air, sometimes under a tree with a backdrop of a parched
landscape, or in some traditional inner meeting space, for instance in
“a grandiose and beautiful hall . . . decorated with finely engraved
wood.”6 Many ethnic groups “lack the regimented institutions of jirga,
but most have traditions of ad hoc village assemblies (shura) that
mediate and make decisions. Dispute resolution relies on village elders
(rishsafid, Persian; aqsaqal, Turkish) or important political leaders to
serve as judges or mediators.”7
For the Western observer immersed in the ideas of the “rule of
law” and the legal state, the nature of these traditional bodies is often
unclear and difficult to interpret. Despite some superficial similarities
to familiar courts––for example, although the men occupy the ground
seemingly at random, it may be noticed that they actually sit in a circle,
which may indicate a kind of a council of elders or trusted men in the
community8––there is nevertheless nothing which truly mirrors the
Western national court. Jirgas rely on neither legislation nor
conventional symbols of the sovereign power of the state and offer no
obvious indications that would allow for ranking these bodies under
the expected forms within the rule of law.9
But descriptions of these institutions of Afghan law typically do
not reach the Czech judges who are supposed to apply this law. The
present discussion describes the gap that arises when one set of legal
assumptions blinds the court to those of a relevant foreign jurisdiction,
a problem of both theoretical and practical significance. It does so by

4.
Hatem Elliesie, Rule of Law in Afghanistan 4–5 (SFB 700 Rule of L. Working
Paper Series, Paper No. 4, 2010).
5.
See, e.g., Ali Wardak & John Braithwaite, Crime and War in Afghanistan:
Part II: A Jeffersonian Alternative?, 53 BRITISH J. CRIMINOLOGY 197, 199 (2013) (“In the
Pashtun-majority areas of Afghanistan, village councils or jirgas ('circles')—or
maraka in the south—are the key decision-making and dispute-resolution institutions,
not only at the village level, but also from the smallest lineage up to tribal and intertribal confederations.”); see also infra, Part III.
6.
INT’L LEGAL FOUND., THE CUSTOMARY LAWS OF AFGHANISTAN: A REPORT 36
(2004).
7.
THOMAS BARFIELD, NEAMAT NOJUMI, & J. ALEXANDER THIER, THE CLASH OF
TWO GOODS: STATE AND NON-STATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN AFGHANISTAN 11 (2006).
8.
HASSAN M. YOUSUFZAI & ALI GOHAR, TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING PUKHTOON
JIRGA: AN INDIGENOUS WAY OF PEACE-BUILDING AND MORE 19 (2012).
9.
There is even “a policy line that a state court system should displace the
patriarchal justice of jirgas/shuras.” Wardak & Braithwaite, supra note 5, at 203. The
claim that jirgas and shuras are irreparably patriarchal and simply displaceable is
nevertheless not our position.
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examining the need for Czech judges to apply that foreign law just as
it works in its original setting.
The lead author encountered this problem when working as a
foreign law expert for the Czech Ministry of Justice from 2009 through
2015. His regular assignment was to help Czech judges to prepare the
application of foreign law. During this time, he was also completing his
studies in anthropology, and the peculiarity of his position as both
researcher and practitioner resulted in a distinctive anthropological
self-awareness when conducting routine legal activities and
conversations with legal professionals. As a legal professional, he
understood that Afghan law would be applied in specific cases by Czech
courts as a “text” that is relatively easily transferable from one country
to another, with the issue being at most its culturally differing legal
interpretations. At the same time, as an anthropologist, he realized
that this transplanted version of Afghan law differed abysmally from
the law as applied in its original world, and that, while some of its
knowledge was successfully transmitted during these trials, other
parts were lost entirely. This opportunity led him to conduct research
in the form of “para-ethnography,”10 which continued in 2018–2019 in
order to seek a situated “participant comprehension”11 of how Czech
courts apply foreign law.
The study and application of foreign law, though a tricky and
ambiguous task, is formally codified and ordinarily perceived as part
of the judges’ standard routine. It is the official duty of the court in
question to take all necessary measures to ascertain the content of the
foreign law, and the court can ask for help from the Ministry of Justice
in this effort.12 The author’s “participant comprehension”13 while

10. Ethnography typically involves the anthropologist interacting and inferring
from culture participants the social rules and norms. These insights are typically
presented in an ethnographic monograph. But when the participants are themselves
producers of the cultural analysis, as in this case the author as a former foreign law
expert and the judges reflecting on the significance of their practices and interpretations,
this approach results in “para-ethnography.” E.g., Gazi Islam, Practitioners as Theorists:
Para-Ethnography and the Collaborative Study of Contemporary Organizations, 18(2)
ORGANIZATIONAL RSCH. METHODS 231, 231 (2015); Annelise Riles, Anthropology, Human
Rights, and Legal Knowledge: Culture in the Iron Cage, 108(1) AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 52,
53 (2006); see generally Tomáš Ledvinka, Právní etnografie a “právo a etnografie”: Dva
přístupy k etnografickému výzkumu práva [Legal Ethnography and “Law and
Ethnography”: Two Approaches to the Ethnographic Research of Law] 108 ČESKÝ LID:
CZECH ETHNOLOGICAL J. (2021) (exploring distinct positions of ethnography in the
domain of law and social anthropology).
11. David Hess, Ethnography and the Development of Science and Technology
Studies, in HANDBOOK OF ETHNOGRAPHY 234, 234 (Paul Atkinson, Amanda Coffey, Sara
Delamont, John Lofland, & Lyn Lofland eds., 2007).
12. See Zákon o mezinárodním právu soukromém [Act on Private International
Law], Zákon č. 91/2012 Sb. §§ 23(2)–(3) (Czech), translated in MINISTRY OF JUSTICE OF
THE CZECH REPUBLIC http://obcanskyzakonik.justice.cz/images/pdf/Act-GoverningPrivate-International-Law.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2021) [https://perma.cc/N4F42WPN] (archived Sept. 15, 2021).
13. See Hess, supra note 11, at 234.
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helping Czech courts as one of their ministerial foreign law experts was
further shaped through anonymous semi-structured interviews with
twenty judges and judges’ assistants, who were professionally
committed to the application of foreign law, and by a number of the
author’s practical experiences and informal conversations with judges
applying foreign law and other legal actors, especially the other
ministerial experts, as well as by his self-reflection upon his daily
routine.14 These experiences included observations on the development
of legal arguments about foreign law and the analysis of legal
documents and internet sources. The formal hierarchy of the Czech
courts was well reflected in the interviews––the author gained access
to three tiers of the Czech justice system, with the Supreme Court of
the Czech Republic represented by two judges, three experts of the
court’s foreign department, and one district judge who had previously
worked at the Supreme Court. It may be noted, however, that the
applications of Afghan law discussed below did not usually reach
beyond the courts of first instance. This Article reflects a small but
revealing segment of a variety of foreign-law adjudication cases in
Czech courts that included the study of foreign law in particular:
Afghan law was involved in four cases during the research periods.
This project employed specific ethnographic solutions that helped
to situate “law” in the ethnological sense within the broader realm of
normativities, practices, and cognitive operations that are
conventionally considered legal practice.15 First, the cases of foreign
law’s study and application were seen as the most appropriate
ethnographic unit upon which to start the study.16 However, the
research focused on soft interpretative strategies behind the scenes,
rather than on the adjudication itself. In this regard the strategy
followed John Conley and William O’Barr’s imperative that, in the
ethnography of legal discourse, it is necessary to give equal
consideration as “paradigmatic artifacts of modern knowledge
practices”17 to “what the participants in legal institutions are
saying.”18
Second, in the context of international civil trials there can arise
a difference between the meaning attributed by legal authorities who
construe foreign law on the basis of documents and the meanings
intended by the authors of those documents. Accordingly, the
discussion focuses first on the gap between the ways Czech judges

14. Interviewed by Tomáš Ledvinka (Feb. 10, 2015; Apr. 4, 2015; May 20, 2015;
and Nov. 9, 2018).
15. For “law” in ethnological terms see especially LEOPOLD POSPÍŠIL, THE
ETHNOLOGY OF LAW 30–51 (1978).
16. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY:
CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE 29 (1941) (discussing the value
of cases).
17. ANNELIESE RILES, DOCUMENTS: ARTIFACTS OF MODERN KNOWLEDGE 2 (2006).
18. JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O’BARR, RULES VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS: THE
ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DISCOURSE 2 (1990).
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apply Afghan law in the textual form of foreign law (Part III), and then
on the ways Afghan “traditional” councils resolve disputes (Part IV).
The legal practices of both Czech judges and Afghan councils are
deemed complex, reasonable, and efficient in the terms of their own
worlds. However, some aspects of Czech legal practices resist being
studied using the conceptual and methodological equipment of legal
ethnology, while conversely some aspects of Afghan legal practices are
not approachable through the categories of conventional legal
education. During trials, it was necessary to grapple with an uneasy
compatibility between the anthropological attitude, on the one hand,
which tends to add culture, context, and details, and, on the other, the
reductionist juridical attitude, which strives to filter out culture and
other “irrelevant” detail.19
II.

THE COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY OF
LEOPOLD POSPÍŠIL

It hardly needs to be said that preconceived categories and
analytical tools of different disciplines imply different research politics
and outputs. In the case at hand, the study of the law of Afghanistan

19. The debate about the divergence between lawyers and anthropologists is
enormous. See, e.g., Riles, supra note 10, at 53 (referring to “longstanding debates in the
anthropology of law and science”); Randy Frances Kandel, Six Differences in
Assumptions and Outlook between Anthropologists and Attorneys, in DOUBLE VISION:
ANTHROPOLOGISTS AT LAW 1–4 (Randy Frances Kandel, Ralph J. Bishop, & Pamela
Amoss, eds., 1992) (listing differences as locating liability v. explanatory analysis,
judgment v. relativity, the concrete v. the wholistic, discrete v. multifactorial causality,
the meaning of fact and truth, and the approach to temporality); Sally Falk Moore, Law
and Anthropology: Research Traditions, in COMPARATIVE LAW & ANTHROPOLOGY 17, 17–
26 (James A.R. Nafziger ed., 2019) (describing anthropological approaches to legal issues
such as human rights, land tenure reform, and other national legislation); James A.R.
Nafziger, Introduction to Comparative Law and Anthropology, in COMPARATIVE LAW &
ANTHROPOLOGY 1, 1–4, 9–12 (James A.R. Nafziger ed., 2019) (addressing “the mutuality,
though certainly not congruence, between the two disciplines [law and anthropology]”);
ANTHONY GOOD, ANTHROPOLOGY AND EXPERTISE IN THE ASYLUM COURTS 15–38 (2006)
(discussing how the relationship between anthropology and law “flourished, waned, and–
arguably – began to prosper again, while . . . display[ing] distinct modes of reasoning and
attitudes to evidence”); JAMES M. DONOVAN & H. EDWIN ANDERSON, III, ANTHROPOLOGY
AND LAW 14–20 (William O. Beeman & David Kertzer, eds., 2003) (discussing the
historical relations between anthropology and law); JAMES M. DONOVAN, LEGAL
ANTHROPOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 197–239 (2008) (touching on the tensions between
law and anthropology in practical scenarios such as terrorism, human rights, intellectual
property rights, and the culture defense); see generally MARK GOODALE, ANTHROPOLOGY
AND LAW: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (2017) (focusing on the crossroads of anthropology
and law); Tomáš Ledvinka, Právo a antropologie: Distinkce, jež neskomírá [Law and
Anthropology: Distinction that does not dissolve] 107 ČESKÝ LID: CZECH ETHNOLOGICAL
J. (2020) (stating that both law and anthropology differ from the anthropology of law
because of the “ethnocentrism of conventional jurisprudence and the understanding of
the Otherness in non-legal anthropology”).

1130

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 54:1123

is often dominated by categories such as the “rule of law,”20 human
rights,21 women’s rights,22 and state-driven modernization.23
Modern—supposedly universal––legal concepts can obstruct the
anthropologists’ vocation to construe the Afghan “traditional” law in
terms of its own world. As such, because the discourse of the rule of law
to which Czech judges “belong”24 envisions legal reform as located in
the future and as a property belonging to the Afghan state,25 the actual
realities of the law on the ground in the present attract little attention,
being regularly perceived as, at most, obstacles that hinder legal
evolution and progress.26
The bias introduced by the rule of law discourse applies for related
legal-cultural dichotomies such as formal–informal, official–
traditional, state–non-state, and law–culture. They all help to generate
a static version of legal pluralism in Afghanistan, one usually reduced
to a combination of three possible forms of law (state legislation,
customary law, and sharīʿah)27 without taking into account how or
whether these forms are actually applied by legal authorities.28 A more

20. See, e.g., Carol Wang, Rule of Law in Afghanistan: Enabling a Constitutional
Framework for Local Accountability, 55 HARV. INT’L L. J. 211, 212 (2014) (examining “the
structural weaknesses and contradictions in rule of law efforts in Afghanistan”).
21. See, e.g., Barnett R. Rubin, Transitional Justice and Human Rights in
Afghanistan, 79 INT’L AFFS. 567, 570–74 (2003) (describing the difficulties in
constructing policies that hold parties accountable for human rights abuses in
Afghanistan).
22. See, e.g., Mark A. Drumbl, Rights, Culture, and Crime: The Role of Rule of
Law for the Women of Afghanistan, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 349, 354–61 (2003)
(listing efforts taken by the Afghan government to address “gender crimes and
institutionalized gender discrimination” and exploring the limited effect of those efforts).
23. See, e.g., SAYED HASSAN AMIN, LAW, REFORM, AND REVOLUTION IN
AFGHANISTAN: IMPLICATIONS FOR CENTRAL ASIA AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD 81–92, 99
(1992) (recounting the government’s attempts to undertake modern legal and social
reform starting at the turn of the twentieth century).
24. Peggy Levitt & Nina Glick Schiller, Conceptualizing Simultaneity: A
Transnational Social Field Perspective on Society, 38 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 1002, 1010
(2004).
25. See Elliesie, supra note 4, at 1–2 (discussing the reform process).
26. For an overview of the rule-of-law reconstruction approaches in Afghanistan,
see generally Geoffrey Swenson, Why U.S. Efforts to Promote the Rule of Law in
Afghanistan Failed, 42 IN’TL SEC. 114, 114–51 (2017).
27. Sharīʿah is usually defined as Islamic religious law. There are, however, more
understandings of this legal system even within Afghanistan. See, e.g., Thomas Barfield,
Afghanistan: The Local and the Global in the Practice of Shariʻa, in SHARI’A POLITICS:
ISLAMIC LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE MODERN WORLD 179, 188–90 (Robert W. Hefner ed.,
2007); see generally Faiz Ahmed, Shariʿa, Custom, and Statutory Law: Comparing State
Approaches to Islamic Jurisprudence, Tribal Autonomy, and Legal Development in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, 7 GLOB. JURIST [i] (2007) for details about the position of
sharīʿah among the state and customary law in Afghanistan.
28. E.g., MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, LAW IN AFGHANISTAN: A STUDY OF THE
CONSTITUTIONS, MATRIMONIAL LAW AND THE JUDICIARY 3–4, 197 (1985) (disqualifying
traditional legal authorities as a form of “tribalism” entirely and recognising it as a legal
means only when initiated by state ministry of justice as an “experimental scheme”);
Nadjma Yassari & Mohammad Hamid Saboory, Sharia and National Law in
Afghanistan, in SHARIA INCORPORATED 273, 273, 313 (Jan Michiel Otto ed., 2010) (these
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dynamic picture of legal pluralism in Afghanistan focuses on the
relationships between Afghan traditional councils such as jirgas and
Afghan state courts, as well as the fluctuation of people between them.
While an improvement, this approach still fails to open the black box
of Afghan “traditional” law.29
In the context of the encounters of Czech judges with Afghan
“traditional” law, this contradiction between data and discourse
unsettles the conventional idea of the rule of law and suggests the need
to employ legal-ethnological concepts in research on the cases. For this
reason, this problematique is deeply related to an extensive debate
about the possibilities of cooperation between two seemingly
irreconcilable positions: the ethnological emphasis on cultural
particularity and the rule-of-law emphasis on modern normative
universality. The mutual relationships between anthropology and
law,30 human rights,31 and legal sciences32 remain somewhat
controversial, while the universal claims of the rule of law and other
legal concepts are broadly accepted among social scientists. The hard
lines have weakened, though. Today, it seems that law and

authors particularly illustrate the paradox of the discourse on Afghanistan´s legal
pluralism: while contemplating the fact that “Afghanistan’s statutory laws and
regulations exist solely on paper”, they claim at the same time that the “reality” is that
“Afghan law is a combination of Islamic law, state legislation, and local customary law”);
Ali Wardak, State and Non-State Justice Systems in Afghanistan: The Need for Synergy,
33 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1145, 1150–59 (2012) (discussing key issues with state and non-state
justice systems).
29. Cf. Antonio De Lauri, Corruption, Legal Modernisation and Judicial Practice
in Afghanistan, 37 ASIAN STUD. REV. 527, 539–41 (2013) (discussing “the interconnection
of customary practices, state judicial mechanisms, references to the principles of Islamic
law, and . . . Western models of justice”).
30. See Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Riding or Killing the Centaur? Reflections
on the Identities of Legal Anthropology, 4 INT’L J. L. CONTEXT 85, 94–101 (2008)
(analyzing the relationship between anthropologists of law, lawyers, sociologists of law,
and general anthropologists); see generally DONOVAN & ANDERSON, supra note 19
(looking at the practical and theoretical benefits of anthropology to law and vice versa);
CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective, in
INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY (Clifford Geertz ed., 2000) (describing the complicated
relationship between anthropology and law); KAIUS TUORI, LAWYERS AND SAVAGES:
ANCIENT HISTORY AND LEGAL REALISM IN THE MAKING OF LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY (2015)
(describing the history of legal anthropology from the nineteenth century to the 1970s);
GOODALE, supra note 19 (offering a comprehensive look at post-Cold War legal
anthropology).
31. Riles, supra note 10, at 52; see also Karen Engle, From Skepticism to Embrace:
Human Rights and the American Anthropological Association from 1947–1999, 23 HUM.
RTS. Q. 536, 538–49 (2001) (dissecting the American Anthropological Association’s
“embarrassing” statement on human rights and detailing anthropologists’ efforts to
distance the field from that statement); Sally Engle Merry, Human Rights Law and the
Demonization of Culture (and Anthropology along the Way), 26 POLITICAL & LEGAL
ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 55, 56–57 (2003) (explaining the tension between anthropologists’
relativist view of culture and activists’ universal conception of human rights).
32. See PAUL BOHANNAN, LAW AND WARFARE: STUDIES IN THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF
CONFLICT 43, 47–48 (Paul Bohannan ed., 1967) (discussing anthropology and its
relationship to legal institutions).

1132

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 54:1123

anthropology have become more aligned––at least in academic
rhetoric––as anthropology’s “culture” concept becomes more fluid and
dynamic, and the contextual limits of many legal ideals better
recognized.33
The earlier divergence between law and anthropology has,
nevertheless, reemerged in situations where anthropologists and their
expertise are invoked during dispute resolution cases.34 This
misalignment has been studied specifically in relation to asylum
proceedings.35 When serving as expert witnesses the pressure and

demands of trials often require anthropologists to compromise the
presentation of their knowledge to conform with a legal way of thinking.
They must speak in the language of “objectivity”—the only language

that modern adjudicators are willing or able to hear.36
Much like asylum proceedings, international civil trials are a site
of struggle over disciplinary ontologies and epistemic authority. Here,
too, the anthropological view concerning the application of foreign law
may be subject to procedural demands and trial pressures. In
particular, the discipline’s insistence on “irreductions”37 and
“commitments to contextual differentiation”38 are contradicted by the
doctrinal and somewhat reductionist legal approach towards foreign
law as merely a text to be interpreted. As a natural response to the
pressure to accommodate the trial setting, social anthropologists tend
to challenge, as in this Article, assumptions that are accepted as
“given” by instead offering a proper ethnographic description or
anthropological reflection on the phenomena of legal concern.39
Part III of this Article outlines the problem to be resolved and
describes the perspectives of Czech judges needing to apply foreign law
in their courts. In trial situations that involve application of foreign
law, legal professionals, such as the authors of documents about

33. See id.
34. See JAMES R.A. NAFZIGER, COMPARATIVE LAW AND ANTHROPOLOGY 7 (James
R. A. Nafziger ed., 2017) (detailing forms of dispute resolution that take place outside
the scope of law enforcement).
35. See NICK GILL & ANTHONY GOOD, ASYLUM DETERMINATION IN EUROPE:
ETHNOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVES 15–18 (Nick Gill & Anthony Good eds., 2019) (explaining
the differences between legal and anthropological approaches to asylum).
36. See GOOD, supra note 19, at 34–37.
37. See BRUNO LATOUR, THE PASTEURIZATION OF FRANCE 192–211 (1988)
(posturing how phenomena such as power, knowledge, force, reason, nature, and culture
cannot and should not be reduced to one another, but can only be understood through
their relationships with one another).
38. Riles, supra note 10, at 54.
39. A telling example of this social anthropologists’ tendency is PAUL BURKE,
LAW'S ANTHROPOLOGY: FROM ETHNOGRAPHY TO EXPERT TESTIMONY IN NATIVE TITLE 241
(2011) (describing the “struggle between judge and expert over the prerogative to
authoritatively interpret the anthropological archive” in particular Australian native
title cases); GOOD, supra note 19, at 208 (reflecting “hegemonic struggle” for authority
between anthropologists as experts witnesses and judiciary within British asylum
trials).
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Afghan law, should be seen as both linguistic and intercultural
“translators.”40 Afghan law itself may be conceptualized as a
“travelling model” or “token” that is “de-territorialised from its original
setting and re-territorialised in new settings and problem-spaces.”41
Fidelity to this translation task requires making legal cultures as
different as those of Afghanistan and the Czech Republic
commensurable while at the same time disqualifying state sovereignty
as a point of departure.
To bridge this gap, the discussion in Part IV adopts Leopold
Pospíšil’s analytical concept of “law” as an open set of elements that
characterize certain social actions as being of a legal nature.42 As “the
divergence . . . between the Czech situation and the Afghan situation”
is enormous,43 the analytical concepts of Pospíšil’s legal ethnology are
needed to overcome the static image of the pluralism of legal forms
(state law, customary law, and sharīʿah).
Because of the heavy work Pospíšil’s work plays in this discussion,
a few additional words of background may be appropriate. Pospíšil’s
concept of “law” is intended to be applicable regardless of whether the
law operates on the level of the state, society as a whole, or on
subsociety or substate levels.44 His innovation helps to distinguish law
from the rest of culture according to four attributes (authority,
intention of universal application, obligation, and sanction).45 Each of
these elements can be relatively easily ascertained in the field, and in
this way Pospíšil’s approach differs from the essentialist categories of
law that allow researchers to project their own cultural assumptions
onto the legal unknown.46
The attribute emphasized in this Article is the presence of legal
authorities (i.e., a person or persons “in many ways comparable to that
of the state . . . [who are] regarded as jural authorities by their

40. See Clark D. Cunningham, Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text:
Towards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298, 1299 (1991-1992)
(offering “the metaphor of the lawyer as translator as a way of both understanding and
altering the ways lawyers change the meanings of their clients' stories”).
41. ANDREA BEHRENDS, SUNG-JOON PARK, & RICHARD ROTTENBURG,
TRAVELLING MODELS IN AFRICAN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: TRANSLATING
TECHNOLOGIES OF SOCIAL ORDERING, 3–4 (Andrea Behrends, Sung-Joon Park, &
Richard Rottenburg eds., 2014).
42. POSPÍŠIL, supra note 15, at 30–51.
43. Jonathan Eddy, Rule of Law in Afghanistan: The Intrusion of Reality in
Afghanistan, 17 J. INT’L COOP. STUD. 1, 4 (2009).
44. See LEOPOLD POSPÍŠIL, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW: A COMPARATIVE THEORY 98–
99 (1971).
45. See id. at 43.
46. Although he eschews it as an exact match, see id. at 275–76, Pospíšil’s method
to objectively identify “law” may still be usefully analogized to that employed by Hohfeld,
who attempted to dissipate the linguistic ambiguity surrounding the term “rights” by
analyzing the recognized applications of the label into a set of legal primitives/or
prerogatives. WESLEY HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN
JUDICIAL REASONING 36–64 (Walter W. Cook ed., 1923).
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followers.”47). The importance given to the element of authority cannot
be better illustrated than by Pospíšil´s brief remark that “the totality
of the principles incorporated in the legal decisions of an authority of a
society’s subgroup constitutes that subgroup’s legal system.”48 This
understanding of “legal authority” forms part of a more complex
comparative theory of law, which avoids the tendency to limit the
inquiry into law to the state level only and which breaks down the
dichotomy between state and nonstate law. As a result, any legal
authority identified by this concept may be situated within a
continuum of various degrees of formality, ranging from extremely
informal to extremely formal, and a continuum of various degrees of
power, ranging from those who rely only on the power of personal
persuasion to those who also use brutal force of various kinds.49 Part
V of this Article suggests adding a third continuum along which an
authority can be situated, ranging from a high degree of social
integration into the social group or subgroup affected by the dispute to
significant remoteness from the social (sub)group(s) in question. This
addition can help account for situations in which a judge is an invited
member of another segment of society or when a stranger fills the role
out of the obligations of hospitality.
The usefulness of this addition arises because even though social
anthropologists as well as many legal scholars would agree in principle
with the Pospíšilian contextual perspective, during actual research
they can be tempted to fall back upon the essentialist viewpoint, such
as the assumption that law is “law” only when promulgated from
states,50
which
then
arguably
leads
into
interpretive
misunderstandings.51 The most common such error is the implied
assertion that stateless societies, lacking law, are thereby necessarily
“lawless,” thus rendering them vulnerable to interventions by

47. Leopold Pospíšil, Legal Levels and Multiplicity of Legal Systems in Human
Societies, 11 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 2, 7–8 (1967).
48. Id. at 9.
49. See POSPÍŠIL, supra note 44, at 60–61.
50. For example, this contrast is sharply apparent when comparing Brian
Tamanaha’s early essentialist claim in defense of legal centrism that “‘law’ is the law of
the state,” Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Folly of the ‘Social Scientific’ Concept of Legal
Pluralism, 20 J. L. & SOC’Y 192, 212 (1993), with his more nuanced, even Pospíšilian,
model that “law is identified not with an abstract concept of definition but through
collective (conventionalist) recognition of law within communities: law is whatever
people identify and treat through their social practices as ‘law.’” BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA,
LEGAL PLURALISM EXPLAINED: HISTORY, THEORY, CONSEQUENCES 206 (2021). Although
Tamanaha would like to continue to withhold the term “law” from the social levels
recognized by Pospíšil, he now concedes that this is an empirical question rather than a
definitional one, to be settled by whether the people regard subnational norms as
functioning as laws. Id.
51. See Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Who is Afraid of Legal Pluralism? J. LEGAL
PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 37, 41–42 (2002) (Many debates and misunderstandings
between legal scientists and legal anthropologists . . . have suffered from the tendency
to . . . look for 'the one' correct or useful concept for both lawyers and social
scientists . . . .”).
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paternalistic law-giving states presumably for the societies’ own
good.52
For this reason, the argument below hopes to strengthen Pospíšil’s
position by approaching law not only in terms of systems of rules, but
also through emphasising the authoritative dimension of law and its
societal configurations as legal sodalities (in which the emphasis is on
law as communication in the form of intergroup meeting-like
associations of legal purpose) as distinct from legal modalities (wherein
the default emphasis is on legal normativity as objective or objectified
systems of legal knowledge). Following Flood’s suggestion that “theory
is to be viewed as part of the research process, not its goal nor
necessarily its starting point,”53 the argument sees the purpose of
using Pospíšil’s analytical concept of “law” as providing a way to
“destabilize taken-for-granted definitions of law, thus revealing the
multiple ways that law is understood and practiced” and “inform[ing]
legal practice and vice versa.”54
III. THE LAW-CULTURE DIVIDE IN INTERNATIONAL CIVIL TRIALS
Tasked with applying foreign law in the same way it works in its
original jurisdiction, Czech judges must first discern what, in fact, the
law is. Trained lawyers look to the foreign analogues of their own legal
systems, which in most instances means statutes passed by national
legislatures and interpreted in state courts. This default orientation
fails in the case of Afghanistan, however, due to the failures of these
institutions and the corresponding overlooking of the more vital
nonstate dispute resolution bodies. As a result, judges often miss
entirely the locus of actual legal work within Afghan society,
dismissing the contrary evidence as mere cultural holdovers that
impede the establishment of a truly modern rule-of-law system. This
Part traces more fully how Czech judges approach the task of
identifying the applicable Afghan law and their reflections on the
significance of the outcome.
The initial step taken by Western legal professionals who wish to
familiarize themselves with the law in Afghanistan is usually to look
at internet sources for legislation. More detailed information about
Afghan law, however, shows that statutory laws, despite their formal
enactment, are generally not applied in the country.55 Additionally, the
state courts, except perhaps the Supreme Court of Afghanistan and a

52. See, e.g., Karl Widerquist & Grant McCall, Myths about the State of Nature
and the Reality of Stateless Societies, 37 ANALYSE & KRITIK 233, 235–42 (2015) (Ger.)
(analyzing the claim that “everyone under a sovereign government is better off”).
53. JOHN FLOOD, THEORY AND METHOD IN SOCIO-LEGAL RESEARCH 33 (Reza
Banakar & Max Travers eds., 2005).
54. SUSAN BIBLER COUTIN & VÉRONIQUE FORTIN, THE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND
SOCIETY 71–72 (Austin Sarat ed., 2015).
55. See Elliesie, supra note 4 at 4–7.
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few other tribunals,56 are massively overshadowed by “traditional”
legal authorities who have played “a central role” and “still govern
daily life of most of the Afghans.”57 To put it bluntly, in many cases,
the state law of Afghanistan can hardly be considered “law” at all, or
at most only a “soft law.”58 By contrast, the Afghan “traditional” law
that is usually hidden from outside observers behind the façade of the
state may stand above rather than beneath the state’s rules.59
This articulation need not imply hierarchies, either between state
courts and “traditional” bodies or between state law and any other law.
Rather, it only suggests that before approaching any conclusion, the
mutual relationships should be determined on a case-by-case basis.
What then is a judge outside Afghanistan to do, after encountering
such unusual information during trials that call for consulting Afghan
law? How does she handle a situation in which state sovereignty,
although important in other domains, does not serve as a solid point of
departure for finding the relevant law? To illuminate this question, the
strategies used by Czech judges to study Afghan law before it can be
applied as binding law to litigants in international civil trials must
first be described.60
When a foreign law is involved in an international civil trial,
Czech judges are usually required to undertake research under the
official imperatives of the aforementioned Article 23 (“The
Ascertainment and Use of Foreign Law”) of the Czech Act on Private
International Law.61 Because judges are not experts on all, if any,
other countries’ legal systems, they must navigate the law of a foreign
state regularly using only their theoretical legal background and
practical knowledge. In practice, the judges themselves become
substitutes for Afghan legal authorities towards the Afghan litigants,
despite the fact that the judges are acknowledged to work merely on
the basis of the scant information available to them. Calling upon

56. Jonathan Eddy, Rule of Law in Afghanistan: The Intrusion of Reality, 17 J.
INT’L COOP. STUD. 1, 1–23 (2009).
57. AFG. LEGAL EDUC. PROJECT, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMMERCIAL LAW OF
AFGHANISTAN 65–66 (Stanford Law School, 2011).
58. See Susanne Schmeidl, Engaging Traditional Justice Mechanisms in
Afghanistan: State Building Opportunity or Dangerous Liaison?, in THE RULE OF LAW IN
AFGHANISTAN: MISSING IN INACTION 149, 158–60 (Whit Mason ed., 2011) (explaining the
perception of the formal legal system in Afghanistan).
59. We attempt to re-articulate in a strictly Pospišil way the phenomenon of “the
subordination of national law to local law.” Karin Ask, Legal Pluralism and Transitional
Justice in Afghanistan: A Gender Perspective, 2003 HUM. RTS. DEV. Y.B. 347, 363 (2003).
60. Cf. Whytock, supra note 3, at 48–52 (discussing how US courts approach the
application of foreign law in domestic courts).
61. Zákon o mezinárodním právu soukromém [Act on Private International Law],
Zákon č. 91/2012 Sb. § 23 (Czech), translated in MINISTRY OF JUSTICE OF THE CZECH
REPUBLIC
http://obcanskyzakonik.justice.cz/images/pdf/Act-Governing-Private-Inter
national-Law.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2021) [https://perma.cc/N4F4-2WPN] (archived
Sept. 15, 2021).
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expert witnesses is permitted by Czech law, but the option is seldom
used. 62
The application of foreign law is one of the core themes of private
international law, whose procedural environment concerns mainly the
resolution of status and property disputes that include a significant
cross-border factor.63 The “connecting factor” might be, for instance,
that one or more of the litigants are foreigners or that the contract is
subject to foreign law.64 Such cross-border trials include numerous
aspects of ethnographic interest, from culturally specific behaviour of
litigants in the courtroom to various cognitive strategies employed by
domestic legal authorities to cope with legal-cultural difference.
Nevertheless, and again in practice, doctrinal inquiry seldom focuses
on more than the interpretation of two elementary issues: what rules
determine the applicable law and whose state courts have
jurisdiction.65
This Article only marginally touches on this doctrinal approach to
foreign law. Rather, it focuses on how the concepts of the rule of law
shape this understanding of what qualifies as the relevant “applicable
law” that feeds into those inquiries. Czech legal doctrine
conventionally divides the application of foreign law in international
civil trials into the phases of determination, study, and application.66
The first phase—determination of the foreign law—involves
identifying which country’s laws should be applied.67 This phase will
decide whether to apply domestic or foreign law to the case as a whole
or to some of its elements.68 To this end, the judge consults treaties on
international legal assistance in private matters, European
regulations, and the Czech Act on International Private Law, all of
which are a part of the Czech legal order.69
In the second, preparatory phase of the study of foreign law, the
Czech court may ask for a copy of the identified foreign law, which is
then usually translated and interpreted on the basis of Czech legal
prescriptions.70 This step serves as a precondition for the third phase,

62. See Postup justičních orgánů ve styku s cizinou ve věcech občanskoprávních
a obchodněprávních [Procedure Of Judicial Authorities In Contact With Foreigners In
Civil And Commercial Matters], Vyhláška č. 7/2018 Sb. (Czech).
63. See ZDENĚK KUČERA, MONIKA PAUKNEROVÁ & KVĚTOSLAV RŮŽIČKA,
MEZINÁRODNÍ PRÁVO SOUKROMÉ [PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW] 23–24 (2015).
64. MONIKA PAUKNEROVÁ, EVROPSKÉ MEZINÁRODNÍ PRÁVO SOUKROMÉ
[EUROPEAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW] 3–12 (C.H. Beck ed., 2013).
65. For an overview of the foreign law adjudication in EU member states, see
generally CARLOS ESPLUGUES, GENERAL REPORT ON THE APPLICATION OF FOREIGN LAW
BY JUDICIAL AND NON-JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES IN EUROPE (Carlos Esplugues, José Luis
Iglesias & Guillermo Palao eds., 2011).
66. See, e.g., KUČERA, PAUKNEROVÁ, & RUZ̊ Ǐ CK
̌ A, supra note 63, at 184–87.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. It is the official duty of the court in question to take all necessary measures
to ascertain the content of the foreign law. See Zákon o mezinárodním právu soukromém
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the appropriate and correct application of foreign law in place of
domestic law. This last process is the most complex and involves
activation of knowledge of the identified foreign laws and precedents,
which have been interpreted in relation to the case.71
This process of applying foreign law may seem to be a formal
procedure.72 But it often evokes a deeply existential dimension. One
judge described an encounter with the foreign law in an international
civil trial in this way:
Before coming to . . . the [Appellate] court, I had a file from 2013. Divorce,
proposed by the Czech husband. They had a minor child, a daughter. So the
proceedings were first about the daughter. It took about a year, and I was hoping
to conclude the case by the end of the year. I applied Czech law, because he was
Czech, and they lived in Bohemia. In applying Czech law, I went against the
cultural otherness of the Japanese wife. She was completely different. Once, she
even left the courtroom. I had to stop the hearing. Although she had known for
a year and a half, two years, that the divorce was coming, she could not come to
terms with it. It ended inconclusively. She returned to the courtroom and I
thought that I would finish the examination. First I examined the husband.
Afterwards I started to examine her, but afterwards the interpreter
suddenly . . . the Japanese woman took a sheet of paper and the interpreter
translated that she could not speak. I tried to contact another interpreter and
the other interpreter told me on the telephone that their mentality is such that
it does not allow for divorce. For them it is something like being an unwed mother
here in the 1920s. She cannot go back to Japan because of how people would look
at her as a divorced woman. Even in the Japanese community here in the Czech
Republic, she would be excluded. And you are applying Czech law.73

[Act on Private International Law], Zákon č. 91/2012 Sb. § 23(2) (Czech), translated in
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC http://obcanskyzakonik.justice.cz/images/
pdf/Act-Governing-Private-International-Law.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/N4F4-2WPN] (archived Sept. 15, 2021). The court may ask for help of
the Ministry of Justice in this effort. See id. at § 23(3).
71. See, e.g., KUČERA, PAUKNEROVÁ, & RUZ̊ Ǐ CK
̌ A, supra note 63.
72. See, e.g., PETR BŘÍZA ET AL., ZÁKON O MEZINÁRODNÍM PRÁVU SOUKROMÉM:
KOMENTÁŘ [ACT ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, A COMMENTARY] 144–51 (2014);
MONIKA PAUKNEROVÁ ET AL., ZÁKON O MEZINÁRODNÍM PRÁVU SOUKROMÉM: KOMENTÁŘ
[ACT ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, A COMMENTARY] 166–73 (2013).
73. Interviewed by Tomáš Ledvinka (Feb. 10, 2015) ("než jsme šla … na tu
odvolačku, tak jsem měla třeba spis z roku 2013, rozvod, návrh podal manžel Čech proti
Japonce, mají nezletilou dceru, takže nejprve probíhalo řízení ohledně nezletilé dcery, to
trvalo cca rok a já jsem si tedy nechávala vyznačit speciálně doložku právní moci, abych
to ještě v prosinci opravdu skončila. Aplikovala jsem české právo, protože on je Čech, žijou
tady v Čechách a při aplikaci českého práva jsem nakonec potom ztroskotala na tom, že
ta kulturní odlišnost té Japonky, je úplně jiná než tady naše, ona mi v jednačce…,
dokonce mi jednačku opustila, já jsem řízení přerušila, přestože věděla už rok a půl, dva
roky už věděla, že rozvod bude, tak se s tím vlastně nedokázala smířit a skončilo to tak,
že když po tom přerušení řízení se vrátili s tlumočnicí, tak jsem si myslela, jak ji
dovyslechnu, nejprve jsem provedla výslech jeho, pak jsem tedy začala vyslýchat ji, no a
pak najednou tlumočnice… Japonka vzala papírek a tlumočnice mi přeložila, že nemůže
mluvit. Já jsem se snažila zajistit jinou tlumočnici a v rámci toho telefonického rozhovoru,
který jsem měla s tou jinou tlumočnicí, mi ta tlumočnice řekla, že ta jejich mentalita je
taková, že nepřipouští rozvod. Pro ně je to něco jako u nás třeba ve 20. letech neprovdaná
matka, která má dítě. Nemůže se tím pádem vrátit do Japonska, protože by se na ni dívali
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The judge thus perceived the trial as an unusual drama that
compelled her to think about the situation in cultural and historical
terms with the help of interpreters and through her own inquiries into
Japanese culture.
In this way the review approaches the particular “alterity,” or
“otherness,” which Afghan law, both state and “traditional,” poses for
Czech judges.74 Since Czech law’s imperative is to apply the foreign law
in the exact way as it is applied in the original “context,”75 the present
analysis will focus on the strategies and dimensions of understanding
the “alterity” of Afghan law. Referring to the anthropological issue of
“alterity” or “otherness” emphasizes that this interrogation of a
situated production of legal-cultural difference is contingent,
heterogenous, and context-specific. It could be contrasted with the
perception of legal differences as a given, such as occurs in a
comparative juxtaposition of one national legal system with another.
This topic––the alterity of foreign law in private international
law––has been addressed in cultural terms somewhat theoretically in
legal studies. For instance, Volkmar Gessner designates (in the title of
the monograph he edited) the treatment of foreign law as “civil
litigation in foreign legal cultures” and emphasizes that “only
anthropological studies are confronted with the problem of legal
diversity” situated in such a context while “[i]n other areas of the
sociology of law, the conflict of laws has never become a major issue.”76
Even in the field of law and anthropology, the ethnological
investigation of the application of foreign law has only recently entered
the research agenda.77 Wolfgang Fikentscher still sees “the legal

určitým způsobem jako na rozvedenou a i tady v té japonské komunitě, tady v Čechách,
by byla vyčleněná z té jejich společnosti. A aplikujete české právo.”).
74. For a fuller social and philosophical unpacking of the term “alterity,” see
Doris Bachmann-Medick, Alterity – A Category of Practice and Analysis, ON CULTURE,
Winter 2017, at 2, 2–10, http://geb.uni-giessen.de/geb/volltexte/2017/13387/pdf/On_
Culture_4_Bachmann-Medick.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2021) [perma.cc/8N34-Q7WG]
(archived Aug. 30, 2021).
75. See Zákon o mezinárodním právu soukromém [Act on Private International
Law], Zákon č. 91/2012 Sb. § 23(1) (Czech), translated in MINISTRY OF JUSTICE OF THE
CZECH REPUBLIC http://obcanskyzakonik.justice.cz/images/pdf/Act-Governing-PrivateInternational-Law.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2021) [https://perma.cc/N4F4-2WPN]
(archived Sept. 15, 2021) (“[S]aid [foreign] body of laws must be applied in the way that
it is used in the territory to which it applies”).
76. Volkmar Gessner, Introduction, in FOREIGN COURTS: CIVIL LITIGATION IN
FOREIGN LEGAL CULTURES 4 (Volkmar Gessner ed., 1996).
77. See e.g., Marie-Claire Foblets, Mobility Versus Law, Mobility in Law: Judges
in Europe Are Confronted with the Thorny Question “Which Law Applies to Litigants of
Migrant Origin?”, in MOBILE PEOPLE, MOBILE LAW: EXPANDING LEGAL RELATIONS IN A
CONTRACTING WORLD 297, 297–99 (Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Keebet von BendaBeckman, & Anne Griffiths eds., 2005) (estimating that this approach originated in the
1960s, a period characterized by mass migration and maintaining ties to one’s country
of origin).
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anthropology of conflict of laws as a novelty,”78 even though the
research on conflict of laws directly addresses the debates on legal
pluralism and interlegality.79 Some legal scholars, however, reflect
that there is a complex theme of “cross-border migration of legal
norms”80 and even suggest, as does Horatia Watt, that “the forum and
the foreign” can be perceived as “the Self and the Other.”81 Nevertheless, methodologically, some writers still continue to uphold
conventional doctrinal positions of legal theory.82
In the case law of the Supreme Court of the Czech Republic, the
“investigation” (“zjišťování” in Czech) of foreign law is in fact a process
subjected to traditional evidentiary principles, excepting the
adversarial principle, which the court replaces with judges’ legal
research.83 This means in practice that Czech judges study foreign law
like old-fashioned, nineteenth-century armchair anthropologists,
reading texts, and reports available online or delivered to them
through diplomatic or consular channels. At the same time, the case
law requires judges to become as “objectively” familiar with foreign law
as with their own.84
In this doctrinal view, there is no explicit difference between the
foreign law as located in its original world and the foreign law applied
within the host country. The intercultural transmission of law is an
issue that is simply overlooked. Nevertheless, the data below will
demonstrate that the practices and strategies judges employ for
purposes of understanding the law are primarily shaped by the tension
between the demand to be “objectively” familiarized with foreign law
and interstate respect for each other’s sovereignty (also termed
“reciprocity”).85 This reciprocity might be perceived not merely as

78. WOLFGANG FIKENTSCHER, LAW AND ANTHROPOLOGY: OUTLINES, ISSUES, AND
SUGGESTIONS 433 (2009).
79. See Tomáš Ledvinka, Bronislaw Malinowski and the Anthropology of Law, in
BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI’S CONCEPT OF LAW 55, 69–72 (Mateusz Stępień ed., 2016); see
also Nafziger, supra note 19, at 9–11; Gessner, supra note 76, at 5 (addressing the
controversies legal pluralism creates for anthropological studies in a national context).
80. Whytock, supra note 3, at 46.
81. See Horatia Muir Watt, Future Directions?, in PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 343, 374 (Horatia Muir Watt & Diego P. Fernández Arroyo
eds., 2014).
82. See, e.g., TAMANAHA, supra note 50 at 206–07 (discussing the approach of “folk
law,” which the author labels a “conventionalist approach”); Gunther Teubner, Global
Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3, 4
(1997).
83. For evidentiary principles related to the investigation of foreign law see, for
example, Rozsudek Nejvyššího soudu České republiky ze dne 17.08.2015 [Decision of
the Supreme Court of Aug. 17, 2015], sp.zn. 21 Cdo 4674/2014 (Czech). In this decision
the court made use of the application of the Isle of Man´s legal system by Czech courts
to specify how foreign law should be ascertained. See id.
84. See id.
85. See Anatol Dutta, Reciprocity, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1466, 1467–69 (Jürgen Basedow, Giesela Rühl, Franco Ferrari &
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stimulating scholarly respect for concrete legal reality but also as
precluding certain avenues of legal research as inappropriate. In this
context, the legal-cultural and spatial distance between domestic and
foreign law becomes a background concern.
While “reciprocity” is a buzzword and, as one judge said, the
“unwritten spirit of the application” of foreign law,86 the doctrinal
interpretation is that “[t]he judge applies foreign law ex officio
irrespective of any reciprocity principle.”87 This contradiction means
merely that the reciprocity has been so deeply embedded in the
individual national systems governing the conflict of rules, and so
generalized in recent international judicial cooperation, that its
application no longer needs to be determined for specific cases.88 A
related term, the “comity of nations,” which “specifically refers to legal
reciprocity, the principle that one jurisdiction will extend certain
courtesies to other nations,”89 is almost unknown in this field in the
Czech Republic. 90
The assumptions supporting legal reciprocity may be seen
primarily as principles that both emanate and distract from respect for
the alterity of Afghan law as perceived by Czech judges. This situation
is not entirely unique, as the law always includes a dimension of
respect for alterity, as legal authorities of whatever kind communicate
their decisions to distinct individuals and social groups which may, in
some fundamental regards, be different from the authorities. In this
sense, the law is essentially directed toward an Other. The alterity of
foreign law nevertheless goes beyond the intra-group relations
between a legal authority and the rest of the group members who follow
his or her legal judgments. As this Part demonstrates, foreign law
adjudication is usually not based on direct communication between
mutually distant, separate legal authorities (be they Czech courts or
Afghan courts) but on the anticipation of the way the other state’s legal
authorities answer to the question “what is the applicable law?” in
specific situations. This might become a crucial obstacle to their
mutual cooperation. In this regard, Czech judges’ respect for the
specific alterity of foreign law, driven by the principle of legal

Pedro de Miguel Asensio eds., 2017) (defining reciprocity as the expectation that other
members of society will react to conduct in an equivalent manner).
86. Interviewed by Tomáš Ledvinka (May 20, 2015).
87. Monika Pauknerová, Czech Republic – Treatment of Foreign Law in the Czech
Republic, in TREATMENT OF FOREIGN LAW – DYNAMICS TOWARDS CONVERGENCE? 113,
115 (Yuko Nishitani ed., 2017).
88. See Anatol Dutta, RECIPROCITY, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL L.AW 1466, 1467–69 (Jürgen Basedow et al. eds., 2017).
89. See
Comity,
USLEGAL, INC.
(last
visited
Dec.
30,
2018),
https://conflictoflaws.uslegal.com/comity/ [https://perma.cc/N85B-YU6W] (archived Aug.
22, 2021).
90. Cf, e.g., BŘÍZA ET AL., supra note 72, at 145–51; see also PAUKNEROVÁ ET AL.,
supra note 72, at 166–73. Even these minute commentaries do not mention the concept
of comity.
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reciprocity, is particularly challenged when the foreign state and the
foreign law diverge. This fracture precisely applies to the law in
Afghanistan.
Extending courtesies to Afghanistan as a nation-state and its
legislation is indeed peculiarly incompatible with respecting Afghan
law. This contradiction may easily escape the attention of Czech judges
when they analyze the situation using conventional legal tools and
categories, which define law as a dimension of a state while making
other forms of law virtually invisible. Although this approach may be
inherently ethnocentric, it is not a conscious strategy of the judges
themselves; rather, it is hidden from them within the category of law
itself.
Active presumptions suggest that law stands with the state above
a society or that it exists autonomously and distinctly outside culture.
This understanding, despite being convenient for transferring Afghan
law across legal-cultural boundaries, transforms the original law when
travelling from its country of origin: the multiple threads linking it to
the world of its home are ripped apart and the remains are situated
within new artificial relations attaching it to the milieu of the host
country.91 In particular, the objectified knowledge of Afghan law is
stripped of the legal authorities which function in the segmented
societal environment of Afghanistan and which correspond to the
ethnological concept of “legal authority,” defined as “a specific
individual or a group of individuals effecting social control” whose
“decisions and advice . . . are followed by the rest of the members of the
group.”92
Although each stage of the law’s travels is laborious, the
knowledge of foreign law at its final destination is seen as “imaginary”
and “approximate,” as one of the judges interviewed has said, rather
than “accurate.”93 Curiously enough, this outcome seems irrelevant for
the operation of transnational governance via private international
law.94 The observation is, however, that Czech judges and foreign law
experts do not a priori exclude any detailed representation of foreign
law, including empirical reports or scholarly articles describing, for
instance, Afghan “traditional” law, but they are usually saved from
having to confront major structural differences by the lack of available
sources or by an inability to find them or to translate them both
linguistically and interculturally. Even when judges go beyond their
comfort zone, they may employ the interpretive schemata mentioned
above—for example, the divide between law and culture—to navigate
this unknown terrain, which may allow recognition of the foreign state

91. E.g., BEHRENDS, PARK, & ROTTENBURG, supra note 41, at 4.
92. POSPÍŠIL, supra note 44, at 44, 47.
93. Interviewed by Tomáš Ledvinka (Apr. 4, 2015) (original: “pomyslný”
“přibližný právo”).
94. See, e.g., BŘÍZA ET AL., supra note 72 at 144–51; see also PAUKNEROVÁ ET AL.,
supra note 72, at 166–73.

2021]

LIMITS OF THE RULE OF LAW

1143

legislation while avoiding such phenomena as “[t]he subordination of
national law to local law,”95 and the true extent of the legal-cultural
distance between the Czech Republic and Afghanistan may go entirely
unnoticed.
One reason why “traditional” Afghan law is not taken into account
is, for example, that Czech judges approach the sources of Afghan law
with a view to answering very specific questions. To paraphrase a judge
preparing for the application of foreign law: “Can a property jointly
owned by two spouses be repossessed even if only one of them owes the
debt in question presuming the spouses object that according to Afghan
law marital property remains separate?”96 When asking such a
fragmentary question, the judge expects an equally fragmentary
answer, which might be a single statement taken from an online source
indicating, for example, that the hanafī legal school preferred by the
Afghan Constitution prescribes the separation of martial property.97
For the Czech judge, this implied that, in contrast to Czech law
regarding marital property, the property of an Afghan wife cannot be
repossessed in the context of the debt of her husband. In another
situation,98 a judge doubted whether an Afghan company that signed
a particular contract was a real entity, whether it ever existed or if it
continued to exist. This question mobilized the Embassy of the Czech
Republic in Kabul, which after several weeks concluded that the issue
could not be verified due to the absence of a central registry and
security obstacles related to accessing such information. In yet another
situation,99 a commercial contract submitted to a court as evidence
required an interpretation in light of Afghan law. In response to its
search for information, the court was provided with an internal
document with Czech translation of a partially unreadable and
incomplete Afghan Commercial Code from a ministerial collection of
translation.
In the last-mentioned situation, the main issue was the authority
of the code in relation to the date when the contract entered into
force.100 This was impossible to determine only on the basis of the
document itself.101 It was necessary to dig into sources beyond state

95. Karin Ask, Legal Pluralism and Transitional Justice in Afghanistan: A
Gender Perspective, 2003 HUMAN RTS. DEV’T YR. (2003) 347, 363 (2003).
96. The author worked as a foreign law expert for the Czech Ministry of Justice
and his regular assignment was to help judges to prepare the application of foreign law.
Sometimes the judges informally called for advice or consultation or formally asked for
materials about foreign law, or both. This Article reflects this routine behind the scenes
of official justice, not the cases themselves. See supra Part I.
97. See KABEH RASTIN-TEHRANI & NADJMA YASSARI, MAX PLANCK MANNUAL ON
FAMILY LAW IN AFGHANISTAN 15, 55 (2011).
98. See supra note 96.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. For complete English translation of Afghan commercial code, AFG. LEGAL
EDUC. PROJECT, COMMERCIAL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN (Elite Legal
Services trans. 2014) [hereinafter AFG. COMMERCIAL Code] https://www-
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legislation, which upended the understanding of Afghan law as state
law. The crucial phrases that entered into the case were that “[i]n most
instances, Afghans resolve their commercial disputes through informal
channels, such as the shura or jirga,” and that “[c]ommercial courts
and government institutions frequently rely upon customary practice
or older laws.”102 These statements clarified that the duty of Czech
courts to apply the law of Afghanistan in the same way as it is applied
by Afghan legal authorities cannot be fulfilled using the simple text of
the Commercial Code of Afghanistan. Although the court searched for
a pretext to rely on state law, further research did not provide one.
Instead of finding evidence for use of state law alongside customary
practices, as implied by limiting phrases like “[i]n most instances” and
“frequently,”103 it was discovered that customary practices were
applied throughout the country, not only in rural areas, which was the
original presupposition, but even in urban contexts.104
The court was completely baffled by this situation as to how to
identify the applicable law since conventional concepts of (state) law
were of no help. It was especially obvious that the juridical reliance on
external resemblances between Czech state law and the state
legislation of Afghanistan did not offer a sure way forward. In this
bewilderment about what the law in Afghanistan actually is, the judge
chose to ignore the data, which directed her away from the use of state
law. The argument for this deliberate decision was that “after all we
do recognize states”105 but not anything beyond them. A likely
interpretation of this argument is that the judge preferred to respect
another state rather than the messy “reality” of law within its territory
because it allowed her to relatively easily resolve the issue.
As the lead author inferred from his cooperation with the judges
applying foreign law, this outcome was in no way an impulsive
decision. The judge in question usually tries to balance the practical
implications of her decision “here”––in the host country––as well as
“out there”––in the country of the litigants’ origin––with regard to
their interest in finding legal certainty. Her strategy to shift from the
relationships between litigants to those of states had very practical
implications: it facilitated continuing the trial without much delay.
While this strategy might be seen as arbitrary, it was in fact not
uncommon in international civil trials.106 Judges are not primarily

cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Commercial-Code-of-AfghanistanALEP-Translation.pdf (last visited Aug. 23, 2021) [https://perma.cc/3AJ8-NUTD]
(archived Aug. 23, 2021).
102. AFG. LEGAL EDUC. PROJECT, supra note 57, at 2.
103. See id.
104. Rebecca Gang, Community-Based Dispute Resolution Processes in Kabul City,
2011 AFG. RSCH. AND EVALUATION UNIT 1, 2.
105. Personal communication (Feb. 17, 2014).
106. Czech courts make sometimes use of and are guided by authoritative
worldwide thematic collections of family law and inheritance law. See FERID, FIRSCHING,
& HAUSMANN, INTERNATIONALES ERBRECHT (2021); see also RIECK & LETTMAIER,
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social scientists but rather persons concerned with matters of practical
power, and an arguably chaotic use of legal doctrines or principles is
one way to keep the system running. The judge’s choice to stick to state
legislation even though it was apparently not the applicable law is, at
least, more considered than the facile discursive practices of the rule of
law which tend to conceptualise law as legislation inside Afghanistan.
After all, the trial situation taking place in the here and now, in the
legal-cultural framework of the Czech court, is only symbolically
related to the situation out there in Afghanistan.
This is not to say, however, that the discourse of the rule of law
shapes information in such a way that problematic and uncertain legal
data which do not fit into preconceived legal categories are erased. On
the contrary, they remain present. Nevertheless, it is curious that
exactly the data that do not fit the doctrine of the connection between
the state and the law are conceptualized by the Czech judge as
“culture,” “context,” or “something like law but not the law”107 and
consequently are not activated in the trial. So it seems that these
strategies of culturalization, contextualization, or delegalization of
legal alterity are used to filter out elements that may disrupt the
routine of judicial practice.
Later, the judge reflected on the issue in this way:
In Afghanistan it works entirely differently as the things there function
alongside one another, the tribal or the regional is simply above the state, in
practical life. So, they can tell you we have a system for this and for that, as if
the way the formal framework functions is one thing, but that, in practice, they
do it according to something entirely different, the customary law, because,
simply, they did it that way for a hundred years, at least so they claim. And that
it should not be like that now . . . the people in a village on the hillside, they are
not concerned . . . but you know what, a village leader or a state judge, if he gets
our judgment on his table, which will probably not happen, he will be pragmatic,
probably, as we are, and would neither show disrespect nor try to grasp it in any
other way than his own, I mean in our way. This is a fact, a reality of judging,
not a culture.108

AUSLÄNDISCHES FAMILIENRECHT (2021). These monumental works comprise statutory
laws of most countries but usually do not particularly concentrate on legal-cultural
differences beyond or beneath the state in particular countries.
107. Interviewed by Tomáš Ledvinka (Apr. 4, 2015) (original: “kulturu” “kontext”
“něco jako právo, ale ne právo”).
108. Interviewed by Tomáš Ledvinka (Nov. 9, 2018) (original: “Jako tak v
Afghánistánu to funguje úplně jinak, takže tam ty věci jedou jakoby jako vedle sebe, prostě
jakoby to kmenový prostě a moc nějakejch regionálních vůdců je prostě nad moc státní v
praktickém životě, takže jakoby tak oni ti můžou říct: A máme na tohle systém, máme
tenhle zákon, todle máme, jako dobrý, to je jedna věc, jak to funguje, jak funguje ten
formální právní rámec, ale to, že prostě v praxi jedou podle úplně něčeho jinýho a
zvykovýho práva, protože prostě to stovky let se dělalo takhle, a to, že to prostě teďka nemá
bejt takhle, . . . to prostě ty lidi ve vesnici v kopci jako nezajímá . . . ale víš ty co? Ten
vesnický pohlavár nebo ten státní soudce, pokud dostane na stůl náš rozsudek, co se
pravděpodobně stane? Bude pragmatický, pravděpodobně jako my, a nebude ho shazovat
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What is newly expressed here is the recognition of the alterity of
Afghan law, which is perceived as a problem in terms of the tacit
assumptions of Czech judges about what the law is, and the
neutralization of its alterity. Even more, in the view of the judge, these
characteristics of Afghan law challenge what is considered legitimate
legal authority towards the litigants, as her main anxiety generated by
the application of foreign law concerns maintaining her legal or
cultural identity––as she said, “after all I am not their judge.”109
However, this worry does not address the question of whether
such legal differences really pose a threat to the identity of modern
centers of legal power or to the legitimacy of state courts with regard
to foreign litigants, or whether, instead, such a threat is merely
imaginary.110 The application of foreign law is a courtesy expressing
respect to another authority, which is in this case primarily perceived
as the Afghan state and not the traditional Afghan conflict resolution
bodies. It is for exactly this reason that judges limit their legal research
to state legislation only. As another judge remarked: “Too thorough
research may disclose the weaknesses of their law” and that might be
perceived as an “indecency,” as it implicitly says that “their law does
not work as well as it should or as well as ours or that it is . . . not
modern or in accordance with the rule of law.”111 Besides, “they [i.e.,
the legal authorities in Afghanistan] would also not study Czech law
that much.”112
This “comity of nations” way of thinking––unimaginable, for
instance, in criminal trials, in which culture defences are mostly
subject to domestic moral imperatives––indicates several things. First,
the judicial study of the law of the Other is perceived as an aspect of
the relations of the authority in question towards another (i.e., the
Afghan state) rather than towards the litigants whose identities are
connected to this state. Second, rule of law and legal modernity are
perceived as something highly desirable, as Czech judges constantly
identify themselves with them. Third, the evidentiary construction of
Afghan law is influenced by searching for an equal or partner legal
order as seen by Czech judges, which is linked with the designification
of any law that is not integral to the state.
The original search for a law of the Afghan Other (“traditional”
law) thus successively crystallizes into producing instead an Afghan

ale ani se ho nebude snažit pochopit jiným způsobem než svým vlastním, myslím tím, tím
našim. Toto je skutečnost, to je realita souzení, to není kultura.”).
109. Id. (emphasis added).
110. Cf. David Graeber, Radical Alterity is Just Another Way of Saying ‘Reality’: A
Reply to Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, 5(2) HAU: J. ETHNOGRAPHIC THEORY 1, 7 (2015).
111. Interviewed by Tomáš Ledvinka (Apr. 4, 2018) (original: “příliš důkladné
zkoumání by ukázalo slabiny toho jejich práva” “nezdvořilost” “že to jejich právo není tak
supr jak by mělo nebo jako to naše, nebo, že je … nemoderní, neodpovídá právnímu
státu.”).
112. Interviewed by Tomáš Ledvinka (Apr. 4, 2018) (original: “Taky by nestudovaly
český právo tak moc.”).
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Double of legal modernity (state legislation) even during the
preparatory phases of applying foreign law in which contrary evidence
was discovered. Through the classification of contradictory data as
merely contextual or cultural, modern juridical categories are protected
from the challenge of the reality of Afghan “traditional” law. In this
juridical view, saying that clusters of customary rules and practices
represent law or that traditional dispute resolution bodies such as the
jirga and shura are equivalents of modern nation-state courts seems
entirely absurd.
However, the discomforting data about the state of the official
justice system suggest that the Afghan state courts function more as
executive than as judicial bodies, and their decisions may be considered
in many cases only nominally legal in nature. Judges in the Czech
Republic can base this conclusion on the following reasons. First, there
is an absence of a fully functioning state justice system and the
majority of cases are resolved outside the state courts.113 Second,
Afghan state law “still lack(s) efficiency, capacity and nationwide
coverage.”114 Third, Afghan state judges are mostly absent from the
courthouses and visit them only irregularly and briefly.115 Fourth,
cases are referred by Afghan state courts to “traditional” dispute
resolution bodies via an official mechanism known as eslaah.116 For an
anthropologist, those data are a reason to conclude that state courts,
despite their designation, are not always “legal authorities,” at least
not as Pospíšil understands them in the sense of individuals or groups
of individuals whose decisions are respected inside the affected social
groups.117
As the lead author noticed during his legal practice, legal
practitioners tend to see those nominal Afghan state courts as the only
fully-fledged equivalents of modern courts. Their conventional
approach understands law as a dimension of the state and excludes
from consideration exactly the data which––in an ethnological view––
support the conclusion that “traditional” Afghan dispute resolution
bodies should also be considered true legal authorities. Judges instead
classify these dispute resolution bodies as “something else than the
law.”118 The external resemblance of Afghan legislation to Czech
statutory laws, with such powerful symbols as state emblems (coat of
arms and flags) or the statue of Iustitia on the façade of a courthouse
or in a courtroom, is as important for its recognition as a partner legal
system.

113. See Elliesie, supra note 4, at 4.
114. See id. at 8.
115. See U.S. Agency Int’l Dev., AFGHANISTAN RULE OF LAW PROJECT 12 (2005)
[hereinafter USAID].
116. See id. at 13, 31, 38.
117. See POSPÍŠIL, supra note 44, at 44, 47.
118. Interviewed by Tomáš Ledvinka (Apr. 4, 2015) (original: “něco jiného než
právo”.).
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Drawing upon the sentiments of the research informants, the
lesson appears to be that the symbols of state and justice are taken to
signal the familiar: the judges are convinced that they “see” an
equivalent of their own statutory laws, and consequently they presume
the state justice system in Afghanistan is more or less the same as their
own.
From the perspective of Pospíšil’s analytical concept of law,
however, Afghan state law might be seen, at least partly, as an
appearance of law or, at the most, as “project[ing] law.”119 Prioritizing
this state law may contradict the actual law inside Afghanistan.
Afghan legislation nevertheless promises an objectivity peculiar to
shared symbols and representations, or to put it another way, it may
constitute a “pseudoconcrete” reality of textual representations of the
law, not the reality of the law itself.120 In this way, the reliance on
external symbols and similarities may be deeply misleading in a
comparative or cross-cultural perspective. The focus on the Afghan
Commercial Code, for instance, diverted the attention of the judge
away from the features of the “traditional” justice system such as
meetings and discussions in mosques, homes, or outside under a shadegiving tree––a notion of justice once common in historical Europe,
though mostly unknown to modern Europeans.121 However, the trope
of legal authority dispensing justice under a tree is often seen as rather
orientalist,122 which is not the position offered here. The recognition of
Afghan “traditional” law through ethnological analytical tools
nevertheless only approaches the native point of view through a small
set of evidentiary documents used for the application of foreign law, as
will be seen in the next Part.
IV. RECOGNIZING AFGHAN “TRADITIONAL” LAW AS “LAW”
As mentioned above, reports about the law and justice apparatus
in Afghanistan regularly mention that the decisions of Afghan state
courts are not always respected, either by the disputing parties or by
the wider public, and that the relevant dispute resolution processes are

119. Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, & Julia Eckert,
Rules of Law and Laws of Ruling: Law and Governance between Past and Future, in
RULES OF LAW AND LAWS OF RULING: ON THE GOVERNANCE OF LAW 1, 4 (Franz von
Benda-Beckmann, Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, & Julia Eckert eds., 2016).
120. See KAREL KOSÍK, DIALECTICS OF THE CONCRETE: A STUDY ON PROBLEMS OF
MAN AND WORLD 2 (Robert S. Cohen & Marx W. Wartofsky eds., 1976).
121. As mentioned above, the author (being a foreign law expert at that time) and
the judge attempted to interpret an internal document with Czech translation of a
partially unreadable and incomplete text of the Afghan Commercial Code from a
ministerial collection of translations. For a complete English translation, see AFG. LEGAL
EDUC. PROJECT, supra note 101.
122. Intisar A. Rabb, Against Kadijustiz: On the Negative Citation of Foreign Law,
48 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 343, 346–47 (2015).
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often carried out by “traditional” legal authorities.123 In this regard,
the state courts do not always correspond with the ethnological concept
of legal authority and do not provide an appropriate point of departure
for outsiders to identify law in Afghanistan.
But if not these, then what fills the niche of “law” in Afghanistan?
By what standard can the traditional dispute resolution practices be
understood as “law”? It is here that Pospíšil’s analysis can be fruitfully
employed. Despite being nonstate institutions, jirgas and shuras
satisfy the criteria to be seen as legitimate sources of law in
Afghanistan.
As described in Part III of this Article, judges applying Afghan law
in the form of foreign law in international civil trials do not usually
take seriously doubts cast on the status of Afghan state courts as the
dominant legal authorities in the country; rather, for reasons discussed
earlier, the judges prefer to treat the Afghan state courts as
counterparts to their own. At the same time, however, the official
imperative of Czech private international law is to apply the law of
another country as it is applied in its original world.124 Such an
imperative tends to radicalize legal research towards a search for the
most concrete law in Afghanistan, and, in this vein, it is necessary to
ask whether Afghan legislation should really be considered the
applicable foreign law. Using the juridical concepts of “state courts”
and “state legislation” to identify the law actually applied in
Afghanistan may only lead the inquiry to an impasse. In such a
situation, an ethnological concept of law such as Pospíšil’s may become
indispensable, but employing this concept brings with it its own
difficulties.
In Pospíšil’s ethnological perspective, the law is to be identified
according to the actual legal authorities on the ground and not
according to similarities and resemblances to the external symbols of
law.125 A persuasive logic stands behind this methodological
suggestion: if one is mistaken about who applies the legal rules, it is
not possible to then be correct about what the law is. Thus, the
“authority” defined in the broadest cross-cultural analytical sense is
also considered the foremost “attribute[] of law.”126 However, when,
guided by the anthropological perspective, a judge in a Western trial
discards state sovereignty as an appropriate point of departure and
begins the study of Afghan “traditional” law from the structure and
mode of constitution of “traditional” Afghan jirgas, she soon realises

123. USAID, supra note 115, at 1; Elliesie, supra note 4, at 4–5.
124. See Zákon o mezinárodním právu soukromém [Act on Private International
Law], Zákon č. 91/2012 Sb. § 23(1) (Czech), translated in MINISTRY OF JUSTICE OF THE
CZECH REPUBLIC http://obcanskyzakonik.justice.cz/images/pdf/Act-Governing-PrivateInternational-Law.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2021) [https://perma.cc/N4F4-2WPN]
(archived Sept. 15, 2021).
125. See POSPÍŠIL, supra note 44, at 44–47.
126. POSPÍŠIL, supra note 15, at 30–42.
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that there is even less solid information about these rules. This gap
may cause further uncertainty among legal professionals who are
applying Afghan law for practical purposes.
For this reason, the research informants were asked questions
such as “whether the law can ever actually be ascertained,” meaning
in the present, or “whether a restatement of such kind of law might be
ever achieved” in the future.127 The results argue that there is indeed
an obstacle that is extremely difficult to overcome, at least in the
context of international civil trials but, on the other hand, there is no
more certain way to identify the actual legal authorities and the
applicable law in Afghanistan.
Pospíšil’s concepts of “law” and “legal authority” are intended as
“analytical tools” and, unlike the essentialist legal categories, suggest
a relatively precise and reliable procedure for identifying the actual
legal authorities on the ground.128 Afghan “traditional” councils might
be considered such legal authorities on the basis of the many occasions
where the parties to a dispute have shown respect for these councils’
decisions. Respect given to decisions is a key criterion of legal authority
in the ethnological sense, and there are enduring and repeated
empirical findings that the councils’ judgments carry the same weight
and respect as court decisions129 and that ordinary people respect
them.130 On the other hand, this observation indicates neither that the
particular “traditional” councils in Afghanistan, which evince many
idiosyncratic features, easily fit into the concept of legal authorities,
nor that the aforementioned observations generally disqualify state
courts as juridical authorities. The concepts of “law” and “legal
authority” must also be tested against the unusual data and, as tools,
should be adjusted where they do not correspond to the data. To this
end, a distinction between legal sodalities (intergroup meeting-like
associations with a legal purpose) and legal modalities (the more
familiar objective or objectified systems of legal knowledge) is
warranted, which would reflect the peculiar flexibility in the way
Afghan law is integrated into the societal structure in the country.
The concept of “legal sodality” is intended to capture aspects of the
actual Afghan legal authorities, which are usually perceived by Czech
judges as confusing or, as one of the research informants claimed,
“extra-terrestrial.”131 These problematic aspects are related to the
differences in the “social organization of law,” to put it in Black’s terms,
or more precisely, the manner in which the Afghan “traditional” legal
authorities are integrated into the overall social organization and the

127.
128.
129.
130.

Interviewed by Tomáš Ledvinka (Feb. 10, 2015).
See POSPÍŠIL, supra note 15, at 7.
YOUSUFZAI & GOHAR, supra note 8, at 75–76.
LYNN CARTER & KERRY CONNOR, A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF
CONTEMPORARY AFGHAN COUNCILS 36 (1989).
131. Interviewed by Tomáš Ledvinka (Apr. 4, 2015) (original: “mimozemské”).
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spatiotemporality that stands behind it.132 This does not automatically
imply that actual Afghan “traditional” law cannot be defined in terms
of a static, coherent structure or system or, by contrast, in terms of a
system that is incoherent, irrational, or unsystematic due to its translocality, trans-collectivity, or multiplicity. To Czech judges,
consequently, the organizational characteristics of Afghan
“traditional” law can fall outside the conventional modern legal
imagination, and this means that its “legalness” may be questioned in
the Western legal framework. The significant argument made by a
Czech judge in an informal communication which favored designifying
the councils was that the councils are something slightly different from
courts but not courts: they are bodies that “only resolve dispute[s].”133
Or perhaps they are “something” that resists understanding as a
different cultural equivalent of the rule of law.
One of the most striking elements of “traditional” councils in
Afghanistan, the one that may constitute their alterity, is that they are
constituted as a meeting between equal individuals of various social
groups to which the parties belong without including any higher
authority.134 Even though this may be the foremost principle of the
social organization of Afghan “traditional” equivalents of modern
courts, there is no way to transfer it smoothly into the Western legal
imagination. In cases of an intergroup dispute that was not settled
otherwise, a legal council can be constituted through a meeting
between both social groups that are mutually sā́raj, or equal.135
Consider what societal aspects the ideal of sā́raj might suggest in
legal practice: a plaintiff who belongs to one social group can be
considered disloyal when demanding a decision from a legal authority
of another social group and, conversely, a decision of a legal authority
which belongs to one social group will not be respected by a party to a
dispute which belongs to another social group. The only way to solve a
dispute between parties from different social groups is by convening a
council on the appropriate legal level, which holds together two
otherwise separate social groups of a lower level or their legal
authorities. This aspect is in fact invisible when the societal
entanglement of law is not considered.
If sā́raj is indeed a principle of the societal arrangement of Afghan
councils, it might be seen as a concrete example of the social

132. See generally Donald Black, The Boundaries of Legal Sociology in THE SOCIAL
ORGANIZATION OF LAW 50–54 (Donald Black & Maureen Mileski eds., 1973).
133. Personal communication (Feb. 17, 2014).
134. See YOUSUFZAI & GOHAR, supra note 8, at 19.
135. See M. IBRAHIM ATAYEE, A DICTIONARY OF THE TERMINOLOGY OF PASHTUN’S
TRIBAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND USAGES 83 (A. Mohammad Shiawary trans., A. Jabar
Nader ed., 1979). The concept is also referred to as ‘musāwat.’ See, e.g., Lutz Rzehak,
Report, Doing Pashto: Pashtunwali as the Ideal of Honourable Behaviour and Tribal Life
among the Pashtuns 1, 12 (2011), http://afghanistan-analysts.net/uploads/20110321LRPashtunwali-FINAL.pdf (last visited Sep. 7, 2021) [https://perma.cc/8BDE-FXQ7]
(archived Sept. 7, 2021).
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anthropological concept of “reciprocity.” In the context of Afghan legal
culture, some authors suggest that the idea of “reciprocity” has an
equivalent in the Afghan concept of “badál,” the term used for feud,
revenge, or blood money.136 However, Yousufzai and Gohar claim that
badál should not be related merely to a particular institution of
revenge but rather to “return, exchange or a reply” in the broadest
sense.137 Similarly, in the entries for “jirga” and “sā́raj” in Atayee’s
dictionary of Pashtun legal terminology, both legal councils and
revenge are conducted between people who are considered equal,
equivalent, or partner to one another. 138
These considerations about the societal organization of Afghan
councils can lead to the conclusion that Afghan “traditional” law should
be classified as what scholars have variously called “reciprocity-based
legal systems”139 or “horizontal legal systems,”140 rather than merely
“non-state justice institutions.”141 If the constitution of Afghan
“traditional” councils between equal individuals representing various
societal segments is a central aspect of Afghan legal life, as it seems to
be in many reports,142 then the preference for binary understandings
of Afghan legal systems can obstruct Western legal authorities’ ability
to identify a legal system of their own equal partners to be applied as
the foreign law, one beyond Afghan state law. This conclusion can be
demonstrated using the problematique of where equality is situated in
European and Afghan cultural settings.
Legal equality is traditionally understood as equality before the
law. Upon closer examination, the concept indicates specific yet
unconscious social arrangements that secure it: the superordinate
position of the code above ordinary persons accompanied by the
superordinate position of the court above the parties, which is backed
by the overwhelming sovereign power of the state.143 In this light, the

136. See USAID, supra note 115, at 49; So Yamane, The Rise of New Madrasas
and the Decline of Tribal Leadership within the Federal Administrated Tribal Area
(FATA), Pakistan, in THE MORAL ECONOMY OF THE MADRASA: ISLAM AND EDUCATION
TODAY 11, 14 (Fariba Adelkhah & Keiko Sakuraieds., 2011); David B. Edwards,
Counterinsurgency as a Cultural System, in READINGS FOR A HISTORY OF
ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 545, 551 (Paul A. Erickson & Liam D. Murphy eds., 4th ed.
2013).
137. YOUSUFZAI & GOHAR, supra note 8, at 78.
138. ATAYEE, supra note 135, at 37–38, 83.
139. LAWRENCE ROSEN, THE JUSTICE OF ISLAM: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON
ISLAMIC LAW AND SOCIETY 59 (2002).
140. MICHAEL BARKUN, LAW WITHOUT SANCTIONS: ORDER IN PRIMITIVE SOCIETIES
AND THE WORLD COMMUNITY 65 (1968).
141. Mathias Kötter, Non-State Justice Institutions: A Matter of Fact and a Matter
of Legislation, in NON-STATE JUSTICE INSTITUTIONS AND THE LAW: DECISION-MAKING AT
THE INTERFACE OF TRADITION, RELIGION AND THE STATE, 155 (Mathias Kötter et al. eds.,
2015).
142. See USAID, supra note 115, at 56; CARTER & CONNOR, supra note 130;
YOUSUFZAI & GOHAR, supra note 8, at 19.
143. William Lucy, Equality Under and Before the Law, 61 U. TORONTO L.J. 411,
411–12 (2011).
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claim that Afghan councils are collective bodies composed of equal
individuals would mean that they stand in stark contrast to the
modern individual judge or tribunal that is clearly situated, at least in
the European legal imaginary, hierarchically above the parties and
witnesses. The description of Afghan “traditional” councils as
collectives of equals then strongly suggests that there are no
individuals who are distinguishable as authorities responsible for a
judgment and that parties and other actors in the trial in question are
equals to conventional judges.144
The problem of the social organization of law is perceived––both
by Western judges who attempt to apply foreign law and by the Afghan
sources for various reports145––as so axiomatic that it is seldom
mentioned at any point in the translation process between the Afghan
and the Western legal frameworks. The detailed descriptions of the
Afghan councils nevertheless indicate another concrete social
arrangement behind legal equality in Afghanistan: within the councils,
various authoritative individuals called “‘Spingiris,’ or “white bearded
elder men,” resolve disputes and “act as judges.”146 They are beyond a
doubt functionally distinguishable from other important actors in a
trial and may be identified as those who play “with sets of small stones
lying before them like a chess board,” which is an “apparent mind
mapping” of legal arguments.147
Saying that all members of Afghan councils are equal thus does
not refer to an equality between parties to the dispute and judges or to
an absence of individual legal authorities in a collective court, but
rather to the relations between judges within the tribunal of a jirga.
As each member of the council represents his social group to which one
party belongs, the idea that the legal authorities within a concrete
dispute resolution body are all mutually equal is a legal ideal or fictio
legis,148 which may counterbalance possible inequalities between different social groups and subgroups in the real world. The equality of the
parties to a dispute is not at all as commonplace as in European
countries but rather a dependent variable or otherwise derivative from
the equality of the legal authorities that together constitute the council
in question. Due to the wide range of social groups in Afghanistan,
councils are established in heterogeneous ways to resolve conflicts
between parties ranging from the level of individuals, families, and
groups of families to the level of entire tribes.149 In any given case, the

144. JOLANTA SIERAKOWSKA-DYNDO, THE BOUNDARIES OF AFGHANS’ POLITICAL
IMAGINATION: THE NORMATIVE-AXIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF AFGHAN TRADITION 9 (2013).
145. See generally CARTER & CONNOR, supra note 130; USAID, supra note 115;
YOUSUFZAI & GOHAR, supra note 8.
146. YOUSUFZAI & GOHAR, supra note 8, at 20.
147. Id. at 19–20, 48.
148. See Thomas Yan, Fictio legis: l’empire de la fiction romaine et ses limites
médiévales, 21 DROITS: REVUE FRANÇAISE DE THEORIE JURIDIQUE 17, 18 (1995).
149. CARTER & CONNOR, supra note 130, at 9, 29; YOUSUFZAI & GOHAR, supra note
8, at 17–19.

1154

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 54:1123

authorities involved always reflect the parties, their identities, and the
object of contention. The composition of jirgas and other councils in
Afghanistan thus depends on what is being contested and where the
parties to the dispute belong. Therefore, any preconceived association
of a council with a particular social group and subgroup would be false.
The composition and size of the council also depends on the nature
of the dispute and whether it is a first trial or a trial initiated by an
appeal.150 Even councils with permanent members meet only
occasionally in order to resolve disputes.151 Accordingly, the more
permanent councils may consist of intra-group legal authorities who
belong to more durable social associations. The absence of any uniform
formal mechanism for the appointment of members to a council not
only indicates that a symbolic and legitimizing power center152 is
missing but also confirms that the authority of the councils and their
powers are constituted in a truly reciprocal way,153 meaning that their
legitimacy is based on the approval of the decision by both parties or
both social groups to which the parties belong,154 instead of any kind
of power monopoly.
The same principle applies to the acceptance or enforcement of the
councils’ decisions, which can hardly be supported by the power of the
absent state. Whereas modern agencies charged with enforcing legal
decisions are commissioned by the state sovereign power, the councils
which resolve disputes rely instead on the power of communities and
their arbakai,155 or mîrs and wazîrs in the case of bazaars.156 Therefore, making a decision at a trial meeting requires persuading the
members of the councils, who are respected as authorities by the social
groups or places they represent within the meeting.157 In this way the

150. YOUSUFZAI & GOHAR, supra note 8, at 20–21.
151. See MOHAMMAD HAMID SABOORY, MAX PLANCK INST. FOR FOREIGN PRIV. L. &
PRIV. INT’L L., FAMILY STRUCTURES AND FAMILY LAW IN AFGHANISTAN 6–7 (Nadjima
Yassari ed., 2005). MAX PLANCK INST. FOR FOREIGN PRIVATE L. & PRIVATE INT’L L.,
FAMILY STRUCTURES AND FAMILY LAW IN AFGHANISTAN: A REPORT OF THE FACT-FINDING
MISSION TO AFGHANISTAN JANUARY–MARCH 2005 6–7 (2005).
152. See PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE PRACTICAL REASON: ON THE THEORY OF ACTION
40–42 (Polity Press trans., Stanford Univ. Press, 1998).
153. See BARFIELD, NOJUMI, & THIER, supra note 7, at 6.
154. See USAID, supra note 115, at 38–40; YOUSUFZAI & GOHAR, supra note 8, at
21, 49, 64.
155. See Mohammad Osman Tariq, Community-Based Security and Justice:
Arbakai in Afghanistan, IDS BULLETIN, March 2009, at 20, https://bulletin.ids.ac.uk/
index.php/idsbo/article/view/677/PDF
(last
visited
Aug.
27,
2021)
[https://perma.cc/AWG9-BMEZ] (archived Aug. 27, 2021).
156. See Klaus Ferdinand, Nomad Expansion and Commerce in Central
Afghanistan: A Sketch of Some Modern Trends, 4 FOLK 123, 154 (1962).
157. See YOUSUFZAI & GOHAR, supra note 8, at 20 (stating that “All the parties
involved are required to respect the Jirga members” but “If the parties have any
reservation, those need to be shared in the pre-mediation process and stage.”); USAID,
supra note 115, at 13, 15 (suggesting the importance of “the personality, experiences,
and social positions of the representatives of each party in a Jirga or Shura rather than
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councils remain inherently segmentary and precisely for this reason
the acceptance of legal decisions or their legitimacy relies so massively
on “the social power of persuasion” and consensus.158 This implies that
the “center[s] of legal power”––defined by Pospíšil as the social
subgroups in which the sanctions (of whatever kind) that secure legal
decisions are most effective and immediate159––are located below
Afghan “traditional” dispute resolution bodies and legitimize them as
a higher legal level.
Much like the way that the concept of a social group is flexible, the
composition of the intergroup legal authorities is determined by
various factors, in particular the “legal level” at which the dispute
arises.160 The composition of the legal authority of jirgas results from a
strategy whereby lower social groups can meet and establish temporary
higher-level legal associations (legal sodalities), while maintaining the
lower-level social associations still primarily relevant for the group
members. Since the precedential case law, narkh or tsə́laj,161 of a
higher level reflects upon the differing clusters of legal principles and
practices of lower social groups, when researching specific cases, the
number of legal levels from the lowest tier should be carefully
established case by case.
This leads to the final and most significant point: In Afghan legal
culture, spatial distances and social boundaries do not preclude the
travel of legal authorities and convening formal trial-meetings between
them for the purposes of resolving cross-border disputes. This fact
places a particular strain on the Western legal imaginary, which ties
the law to specific spatiotemporalities where political or geographic
borders are usually seen as absolute dividing lines between systems of
rules. Correspondingly, jurisdictions of concrete legal authorities are
regularly strictly fixed to a particular geographic unit, such as the
nation-state, region, or district. As the laws of various Afghan
communities are not written and cannot be sent via post, the various
legal authorities travel and meet one another in order to form councils,
make decisions, and resolve disputes, thus transcending the local and
societal boundaries of their lower-level “jurisdictions.” In this light, it
is the specific spatiotemporality embedded in the concepts of state
borders and conflict of laws which hinders the imagining of “intersovereign courts” that are a common phenomenon in the Afghan
situation of segmentary (for instance, intertribal or intervillage)
relations. In order to navigate more appropriately in such situations,
the concept of “legal sodality” is offered as an analytical tool in relation
to the Afghan situation, one which could help to understand this

formal principles of law” as well as “the social power of persuasion” as being an asset of
Jirga and Shura”).
158. See USAID, supra note 115, at 5, 13, 15.
159. See POSPÍŠIL, supra note 44, at 116–19.
160. See Pospíšil, supra note 47, at 9.
161. See ATAYEE, supra note 135, at 67; INT’L LEGAL FOUND., supra note 6, at 9.
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nonstate societal and spatial configuration of law as a possible specific
variant of the rule of law.
V.

TRANSNATIONAL AND TRANSLOCAL: THE LENS OF LEGAL
SODALITIES

As jirgas and shuras are convocations of equals representing the
parties, the problem quickly arises as to how disputes between groups
can be handled. Lacking a strong unifying state to enforce a single legal
process, a different method must be found. The temporary
agglomeration of involved parties for purposes of resolving specific
legal questions solves this potential obstacle. Viewing the process
through the concept of legal sodalities enables the observer to more
fully understand the reciprocal respect that allows Afghan
“traditional” justice to do its work.
Afghan “traditional” councils or jirgas do not perfectly match the
ethnological concept of “legal authority.” Pospíšil’s concept of “law”
suggests that the “adjudicating authority has to have power over both
parties to the dispute––he must have jurisdiction over both litigants”
or, in other words, “all three, the two litigants as well as the authority,
have to belong to the same social group.”162 Does the intertribal nature
of councils contravene Pospíšil’s presupposition that law is
fundamentally an intragroup phenomenon?163 Not necessarily: by
acting on a higher legal level, the legal authorities from different tribes
establish a greater common social group that incorporates the
subgroups involved in the dispute. This higher legal level is not stable
enough to be the basis for a durable, long-term higher level of social
association. Dispute resolution gatherings at this level, like jirga,
shura, and others, which may also be termed mobile or segmentary
courts, are socially less stable but legally fully effective associations.
This does not refer abstractly to the interaction between legal systems,
but to a very concrete direct channel of face-to-face interaction between
Afghan “traditional” legal authorities.
To capture the features of their societal organization, the councils
should be analysed through the concept of the legal sodality, which
may help rationalize the apparent idiosyncrasies of Afghan
“traditional” law that are often perceived as incoherent and chaotic
from the perspective of Western legal frameworks. This analysis may
reveal that, far from being chaotic, the councils are in fact based on a
discernible societal logic of relatively mobile and nonpermanent courts,
established via meetings of otherwise separate legal authorities of the
social groups to which the parties to the dispute belong.
Since Afghan “traditional” legal systems, as sets of rules, do not
travel in the form of textual representations, there has to be another

162. Pospíšil, supra note 47, at 24.
163. See POSPÍŠIL, supra note 44, at 8–9.
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legal technology to handle human movement across societal and
geographic boundaries with the concomitant disputes. The Afghan
councils’ members do in fact travel and visit or are invited by disputing
parties. In this way they carry the clusters of their principles, concepts,
or practices with them. The travel of authoritative individuals under
the protection of the codes of hospitality is a manner in which the
multiple “traditional” legal systems interact with and transcend the
legal units of Afghanistan that are conceptualized in terms of localities
and communities. The legal authorities of two Pashtun tribes, for
instance, come together to resolve a dispute, and, as a by-product,
enact a higher legal level by issuing intertribal legal decisions.
Although such legal sodalities are more fragile and less noticeable
to outside observers, they create laws (in the ethnological as well as
juridical sense) which are eventually attached to more durable social
groups or subgroups, as the decisions are recognized inside both groups
and because the laws are created by both groups’ authorities. In this
regard, legal sodality may be taken as the opposite of legal modality,
whose point of reference is a stable and easily recognizable social unit
of any size and kind. On the other hand, the creation of councils
certainly contributes also to the reestablishment of parties’ identities
(social subgroups) as well as their common referent, an authority
allocated on a higher legal level, ranging from family to tribe to state.
This suggests that legal sodalities cannot in principle be limited to only
two affected social segments or subgroups––which has been the model
situation so far. The convening of occasional “councils” with various
other social (sub)groups––for instance, additional tribes––may indeed
explain why many, often distant, legal forums in Afghanistan
relatively homogeneously refer to the same codes, such as
‘Pashtunwali’ or others.164
This Article is not primarily intended as an anthropological
comparison, but a clear contrast emerges between two concrete
technological solutions that make it possible for law to transcend
societal and geographical boundaries and maintain its effectiveness in
cases where disputes result from transactions between distant and
mobile contractors: the application of foreign law in international civil
trials (as detailed in Part III of this Article) and the Afghan legal
sodalities (as in Part V). They both should be seen as a response to the
same organizational problem: the need to manage disputes where the
parties belong to different “jurisdictions.” The effectiveness of the
hierarchy of the intimate intragroup relationships between the social
group’s legal authority and the rest of the group’s members could

164. See Barfield, supra note 27, at 186. For the perception of Pashtunwali in
recent scholarship, see, for example, Antonio De Lauri, Law in Afghanistan: A Critique
of Post-2001 Reconstruction, J. CRITICAL GLOBALISATION STUD. 6, 25 n.17 (2013);
Thomas Barfield, Culture and Custom in Nation-Building: Law in Afghanistan, 60 ME.
L. REV. 347, 351–52 (2008) [hereinafter Barfield, Culture and Custom].
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indeed be disrupted by situations such as international or intertribal
trade and migration.165
In such situations when one of the parties does not belong to the
same social group as both the other party and the legal authority, and
might feel more loyal to an external, foreign legal authority, it is highly
desirable that the autonomy or micro-sovereignty of the social group or
subgroup in question be aligned, or at least coordinated, with the other
legal authority or the other legal regulation outside the conventional
extent of its societal “jurisdiction.” Otherwise, as the two authorities
(domestic and foreign) may apply different laws in different ways, they
may also issue contradictory legal decisions in the same case. Both
legal authorities thus have a chance to mutually cooperate––while
reciprocally respecting each other––in order to harmonize their
resolutions of disputes and to resolve and realign the bifurcated respect
of the nonauthoritative “others” from different communities or
localities.
One way to solve this issue is via a translocal or trans-societal faceto-face meeting of legal authorities conducted within the “code of
hospitality”166 as seen in Afghan “traditional” councils, a solution
which is inconceivable for Western judges. In such a configuration of
visiting authorities, written laws are simply not necessary. The
Western judges, by contrast, incline to the other solution, namely, the
application of foreign law. This result suggests that while the Afghan
legal sodality represents a situation of immediate relations between
concrete members of the affected social groups without the interference
of technological substitutes, the application of foreign law is
characterized by two kinds of substitutions (thus making it less
authentic than “traditional” Afghan councils): textual representations
of the law replacing the mobile law actually applied in the country of
origin and state courts of the host country replacing the legal
authorities from a migrant litigant’s country of origin. It seems that
the foreign legal authority is more acceptable to the Western legal
framework as a specific species of the Other in its substitutive forms
such as legislation and written legal decisions rather than in its
authentic, immediate face-to-face form.
Perhaps the fact that substitutive forms of legal authority are
much more acceptable (or even more convincing) than a direct meeting
with an Other legal authority corresponds with the invisibility of

165. See MAX WEBER, GENERAL ECONOMIC HISTORY 195 (Frank H. Knight trans.,
Greenberg 1927) (1923) (defining trade as a phenomenon “external” to tribes or being
located “between” communities); JULIAN PITT-RIVERS, The Law of Hospitality, in THE
FATE OF SHECHEM OR THE POLITICS OF SEX: ESSAYS IN THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE
MEDITERRANEAN 94–112 (1977), reprinted in 2 HAU: J. ETHNOGRAPHIC THEORY 501
(2012) (overviewing culturally diverse treatments of various kinds of strangers and the
mitigation of their disruptive potential towards established intra-community
hierarchies).
166. See generally PITT-RIVERS, supra note 165.
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authority as a human in the interspace between subjective rights and
objective laws suggested by modern legal orthodoxy. However, this
technology of substitutes may be seen as characteristic for the legal
environment dominated by legal modalities (objectified systems of
norms, structures of beliefs or values such as legal systems, customs,
or cultures) like the culture of legal modernity in European countries.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Afghan “traditional” law as conceptualized in terms of Pospíšil’s
ethnological concept of “law”167 might be perceived as a Pandora’s box
by legal professionals in the West. Once opened, it reveals the
multiplicity of “traditional” legal systems whose point of reference is a
mosaic of social groups and subgroups, as in Afghanistan where the
firm sovereignty of a single state is lacking. Although both social
anthropology and legal studies have widely accepted the notion of legal
pluralism, some researchers have retreated from this distinctive
anthropological concept and reduced legal pluralism only to the
mixture of legal traditions (state legislation, sharīʿah, and customary
law) or relationships between state and nonstate legal authorities.168
This generalization also applies to some studies of the law in
Afghanistan.169 Many researchers who have taken the “rule of law”

concept as their starting point have directed their attention primarily to the
country’s three major sources of law (state legislation, sharīʿah, and

customary law) or the distinction between formal and informal170 and
similar dichotomies.171 As a result, the apparent multiplicity of
“traditional” Afghan legal systems, which have been described as “a
wide variety of cluster [sic] of norms and practices, often uncodified
and orally transmitted, usually combined together in varying
mixes,”172 are entirely disqualified as informal, restorative, or
nonstate, etc.
A similar tendency may be found in the practices used in
international civil trials for the application of Afghan law as binding
foreign law. As described in Part III of this Article, when conventional
legal categories are used by legal professionals to identify the

167. POSPÍŠIL, supra note 15, at 8–13.
168. See, e.g., TAMANAHA, supra note 50, at 205–06.
169. See generally KAMALI, supra note 28; Yassari & Saboory, supra note 28;
Wardak, supra note 28; AMIN, supra note 23.
170. See, e.g., JENNIFER BRICK MURTAZASHVILI, INFORMAL ORDER AND THE STATE
IN AFGHANISTAN xxxv, 10 (2016) (distinguishing between “archaic, traditional, and
informal order” and “modern, codified form” of legal order associated with the State).
171. Besides the formality–informality distinction, various authors either applied
or criticized various other distinctions and dichotomies which were used to characterize
the legal landscape of Afghanistan, for instance, state–non-state (see BARFIELD, NOJUMI,
& THIER, supra note 7), law–custom (see Barfield, Culture and Custom, supra note 164),
restorative–retributive (see Lauri, supra note 164, at 12–17).
172. USAID, supra note 115, at 4.
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applicable law when studying documents about Afghan law, the
resultant, identified Afghan law is inherently linked to the state. On
the other hand, when anthropologists identify the applicable law with
the help of anthropological analytical concepts, as shown in Part IV of
this Article, the applicable law is identified with clusters of legal
principles, practices, and values situated beyond the Afghan state and
its legislation.
“Law” from the ethnological perspective, on the other hand,
primarily identifies legal authorities on the basis of the respect
disputing parties have for the decisions of this individual or group of
individuals.173 While this metric will ratify the conventional
understanding in most Western societies, it is able to encompass more.
In the present example, it discards the Afghan state legislation and the
apparatus of state justice in many cases as being of legal nature only
nominally.174 Legal authorities in the ethnological sense mostly
correspond with jirgas and other dispute resolution bodies. These
Afghan councils may be seen either as alternatives to Afghan state
courts, which cooperate with them in some cases or which stand above
them with regard to the litigants in other cases. Thus, what Western
legal professionals and what legal ethnologists each see as the “law” in
Afghanistan are two very different things with almost no overlap
between them. Anthropological expertise can be employed to assist the
legal apparatus in trial situations such as asylum proceedings or
international civil trials to reflect, at least, upon the issue of an
intercultural translation of the foreign law from its original world into
the Western rule-of-law framework.
The general lesson from such studies is that the law from “out
there” is transformed as it travels. It can hardly be an exact replica of
the original,175 but even though the detailed descriptions of its alterity,
idiosyncratic aspects, and peculiar features are included in various
available sources, the judges in this case study evince an absence of
appropriate cognitive containers which could enable them to transfer
the “traditional” law into the imaginary of Western legal professionals.
As a result, the legal knowledge travelling from Afghanistan to the
Czech Republic is too readily “accepted through deference” and
directed towards an Other sovereign state, rather than through
understanding the alterity of the law inside that state’s territory.176
Since alternative models of the law are absent in the shadow of
state law, it is difficult to notice and recognize very different kinds of
law and legal authorities in different cultural contexts. This myopia is
shown to be especially true in Afghanistan, weighed under the
tremendous influence of the rule-of-law assumption that law must

173.
174.
175.
176.

POSPÍŠIL, supra note 15, at 13, 30.
See ELLIESIE, supra note 4, at 4.
Cf. BEHRENDS, PARK, & ROTTENBURG, supra note 41.
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assume the form of a system related to society as a whole. In this
context, the mosaic of social groups and subgroups constitutes a rather
uneasy reference point for legal analysis. For this reason, the concept
of legal sodality affords a better understanding of the special nature of
the actual “traditional” legal authorities in Afghanistan, allowing an
escape from the sociological bias generated by Western legal orthodoxy
and supporting the classification of the Afghan “traditional” law as a
nonstate variant of the rule of law. This insight should be applicable to
other contexts as well, wherever peoples order themselves outside the
strictures of state institutions.

